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I. KLEENUP'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW WAS TIMELY FILED WITHIN 
THE PARAMETERS OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
Kleenup's Petition for Writ of Review was timely filed within the thirty-day period 
following the deemed denial date of its Motion for Reconsideration under the parameters of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3) and -14(3). Kleenup filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 
20, 2002, and filed a Petition for Writ of Review on March 27, 2002. According to this Court's 
interpretation of section 13(3) and -14(3), a party petitioning for judicial review of an 
administrative order has two choices: file the petition within thirty days after the twenty-day 
deemed denied period in section 63-46b-13(3) or file the petition within thirty days after the 
agency issued its order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. 49th Street Galleria v. Tax 
Comm 'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah App. 1993). Appendix A. See also Harper Investments, Inc. 
v. Auditing Division, 868 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Utah 1994) (".. . section 63-46b-14(3)(a) allows a 
party to file a petition for judicial review within thirty days after the date on which an order was 
issued or was considered to have been issued."). Appendix A. 
The fact that in the instant case the Labor Commission purported to extend its response 
time for issuing an order to March 31, 2002 does not remove Kleenup's option to file the Petition 
after the twenty-day deemed denied date of March 12, 2002. As noted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Harper Investments, a potential petitioner who does not file within thirty days of the 
deemed denial date assumes the risk of missing the deadline if the agency does not issue a final 
order. Id. at 816. The Commission's purported extension did not establish a new deemed denied 
date upon which Kleenup could rely in the event that the Commission failed to issue its order. 
Moreover, McCoy's reliance on Maverik Country Stores Inc. v. Industrial Comm 'n9 860 
1 
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i 
P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993) is misplaced. Appendix A. The facts, circumstances and pertinent 
statutory review of the Maverik case are neither analogous nor relevant to the instant case. In 
Maverik, the petitioners filed a Writ of Review with this Court on the ALJ's order without first 
seeking the agency review required by statute, and subsequently filed a Motion for Review for 
agency review with the Industrial Commission while the Writ of Review was pending so that 
there were simultaneous judicial review and agency review proceedings on the same order. Id. at 
947. There was no Motion for Reconsideration filed; indeed, at the time the petitioner filed the 
Writ of Review there was not even a Motion for Review before the Commission. 
II. KLEENUP MARSHALED EVIDENCE THAT WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
LABOR COMMISSION AND MCCOY'S RELIANCE ON MA VERIK IS MISPLACED. 
McCoy assails Kleenup for marshaling evidence that she asserts is not properly before the 
Court, specifically McCoy's deposition and an affidavit from Dr. Tarbet. However, her claims 
are without merit. "It is important to note that the [Labor] Commission, not the ALJ, is the 
ultimate finder of fact. Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990). 
Appendix A. Thus, it is not "new evidence" before the Court insofar as this same evidence was 
submitted to the ultimate finder of fact, the Labor Commission, and available pursuant to its 
review of the ALJ's order. Of note, the statutory provision for admission of evidence in Utah 
Code Ann.§ 34A-2-802 states, in part, with our emphasis, "The commission may received as 
evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant. . . ." 
The deposition was included in Kleenup's Motion for Review submitted to the Commission as 
the ultimate fact finder, and thus is properly part of the record in this case. Moreover, McCoy 
did not object to the deposition's inclusion in the record at the time she responded to Kleenup's 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion for Review; any ensuing objection on appeal before this Court is waived. See Esquivel v. 
Labor Commission, 2000 UT 66 \ 34, 7 P.3d 782.f 21-23, 973 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1999) 
Likewise, Dr. Tarbet's affidavit was included in the record by the Labor Commission, as 
indicated by the index transmitted by the Commission to this Court. Appendix B. Kleenup 
submitted this affidavit to the Labor Commission after the hearing before the ALJ. Because the 
Labor Commission included the affidavit in the record of this case, presumably the Commission 
considered it as evidence during its review of the record. 
Petitioner relies on the King v. Industrial Comm % 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993) in 
stating that temporary total disability benefits are owed even if the control of the situation is out 
of the hands of the employer. However, King is easily distinguishable from this case. In King, 
the Petitioner was awarded temporary total disability benefits because he was not medically 
stable. King was given a light duty release. King was scheduled for surgery and just prior to the 
surgery, was incarcerated in jail and the temporary total disability benefits had to continue being 
paid because he was still completely and totally disabled. It did not matter if King was in or out 
of jail, his doctor said that he could not work. Conversely, in this case, no temporary total 
disability benefits had been awarded when Petitioner quit her job. In fact, there is no concurrent 
medical evidence that supports Petitioner's claim that she should have been on light duty 
restrictions. The only concurrent evidence that supports her claim for light duty was her own 
self-serving testimony. The big difference between King and this case is that the employer could 
have provided light duty employment had Petitioner been able to produce a medical release 
giving her light duty. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. KLEENUP HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO ASSERT THAT MCCOY'S 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS CANNOT BE RELIED UPON AS FOUNDATION FOR 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
{ 
McCoy incorrectly contends that Kleenup waived its right to deem evidence as hearsay 
by failing to object to her hearsay statements in the evidentiary hearing. However, her 
statements and ensuing analysis are flawed. As we have previously stated, hearsay statements 
are admissible evidence in administrative proceedings. Hoskings v. Industrial Comm 'n, 918 
P.2d 150,155 (Utah App. 1996) Petitioner's Brief Appendix J. Further, "hearsay statements are 
admissible even if objected to during the course of an administrative hearing. Id. Thus, whether 
or not a party objects to a hearsay statement in an administrative proceeding is of no 
consequence because such an objection has no force or effect on the statement's admissibility. 
The matter of hearsay in the administrative forum requires some clarification. There are 
two types of hearsay evidence that may be introduced in an administrative hearing: hearsay 
statements that fall under the array of exceptions to Utah R. Evid. 803 and thus are admissible in 
a court of law, i.e., the judicial forum, and pure hearsay statements as defined by Utah R. Evid. 
801 which are not admissible in a court of law. Although pure hearsay may be properly 
introduced in the hearing, the ALJ is precluded from solely relying on such evidence in 
promulgating his or her findings of fact. Hoskings, 918 P.2d at 155. As was shown in the 
defendant's brief, Judge Hann relied solely on the claimant's testimony that she needed light 
duty when she quit her job with Kleenup. Petitioner stated that she told several medical 
providers about her alleged condition; yet, not one of the concurrent medical records supports her 
testimony. Consequently, Judge Hann erred when she accepted the hearsay testimony as fact 
when the medical records did not support this claim. 
4 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the defendants' brief was timely filed and the defendants properly marshaled the 
evidence, the petitioner's claims are without merit. Moreover, the defendants raised their 
objection to Judge Hann's reliance on hearsay evidence, which was in violation of the residuum 
rule, when they filed their motion for review. Consequently, defendants ask this Court to reverse 
the Labor Commission's decision in its award of retroactive temporary disability benefits. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2002 
Eugege C. Miller Jr., Counsel foi^ Petitioners 
Utaii Disaster Kleenup and Workers 
Compensation Fund 
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860 P.2d 996, 49th Street Galleria v. Tax Com'n, Auditing Div., (Utah App. 1993) Page 1 
*996 860P.2d996 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
The 49TH STREET GALLERIA, Petitioner, 
v. 
TAX COMMISSION, AUDITING DIVISION, 
State of Utah, Respondent. 
Alan V. Funk, Coopers & Lybrand, Intervenor. 
No. 930053-CA. 
Oct. 7, 1993. 
Amusement arcade sought review of decision by state 
Tax Commission requiring collection of sales tax on 
fees collected for alleged "admission" to batting cages, 
laser tag game, and roller skating rink. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that fee charged was for use of 
particular games and not for admission to particular 
place, and, thus, sales tax could not be imposed. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Taxation <S=>493.3 
371 — 
371V Levy and Assessment 
371V(G) Review, Correction, or Setting Aside of 
Assessment 
371V(G)2 Proceedings Before Board or Officer 
37lk493 Review by Courts 
371k493.3 Time of Taking Proceedings. 
Party may file petition for judicial review of Tax 
Commission's finding within 30 days after order 
constituting final agency action "or" within 30 days 
after "deemed denied" date so that, where Tax 
Commission denied motion for reconsideration more 
than 30 days after its final action, petition for review of 
denial filed within 30 days of disposition was timely. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(a, b). 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure ^ ^ O O 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak800 Statutory Questions. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Taxation <§=> 1319 
371 — 
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts 
Taxes 
371XVI(C) Assessment, Payment, and Enforcement 
371XVI(C)1 Levy and Assessment 
371kl319 Judicial Review and Relief Against 
Assessments. 
Because Tax Commission does not have explicit 
grant of discretion, its action in interpreting scope of 
sales tax on "admissions" had to be reviewed without 
deference and for correctness. U.C.A.1953, 59-1-610, 
59-12-103, 59-12-103(l)(f). 
[3] Taxation <§=> 1231.1 
371 — 
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts 
Taxes 
371XVI(B) Tax Liability and Exemptions 
371XVI(B)1 Transactions Taxable in General 
371kl231 Subjects and Exemptions in General 
371kl231.1 In General. 
Tax Commission could not require sales tax to be 
charged for "admissions" based on fees charged for use 
of batting cages, roller rink, and laser tag absent 
showing that fee was charged for right to enter place 
rather than being charged for right to use facilities or 
equipment within the place; use of laser tag or roller 
skating areas was no different from use of bowling 
lanes and batting cages, for which no sales tax was 
applied. 
[4] Taxation <&» 1231.1 
371 — 
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts 
Taxes 
371XVI(B) Tax Liability and Exemptions 
371XVI(B)1 Transactions Taxable in General 
371kl231 Subjects and Exemptions in General 
371kl231.1 In General. 
Amusement arcade was not liable for admission tax 
on activities such as roller skating, use of batting cages, 
and laser tag in light of showing that no fee was 
charged by arcade for admission to any place but rather 
fee was charged only to perform particular activities. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-1-610, 59-l-610(l)(b), (2), 63-46b-l 
et seq., 63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii). 
LaVar F. Christensen, Midvale, for petitioner. 
Jan Graham and John C. McCarrey, Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 
Stephen W. Rupp, Salt Lake City, for intervenor. 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
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860 P.2d 996, 49th Street Galleria v. Tax Com'n, Auditing Div., (Utah App. 1993) Page 2 
The 49th Street Galleria seeks our review of a 
decision by the Utah State Tax Commission requiring 
the collection of a sales tax by the Galleria on fees 
collected for "admission" to its batting cages, laser tag 
game, and roller skating rink under Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-103 (1992). (FN1) We reverse *997 on the 
basis that no admission fee, of the sort contemplated in 
the statute, is charged by the Galleria. 
FACTS 
In 1984, the Galleria opened for business as an 
indoor entertainment mall in Murray, Utah. The mall 
houses arcade games, video machines, a bowling alley, 
a miniature golf course, amusement rides, roller 
skating, batting and pitching cages, food concessions, 
and laser tag. (FN2) The public may enter the Galleria 
without charge, and tables and seats are placed 
throughout the mall for the public to use free of charge. 
Fees are assessed only when an individual decides to 
participate in one of the many available activities. 
Turning to the activities at issue in this case, a batting 
cage consists of a fenced area containing a machine 
that pitches baseballs or softballs to customers standing 
within the cage. The machine is operated either by 
tokens or by cash payment to an attendant. An 
individual pays to have the ball delivered by the 
machine. A fee is not charged for simply entering the 
batting cage and, indeed, coaches are allowed to stand 
in the cage and advise the batter without paying an 
admission charge. 
The record contains a less detailed description of 
laser tag, but indicates it is operated in a manner 
similar to the batting cages. The Tax Commission's 
findings state that "[u]pon payment of a cash fee, 
customers were provided laser guns and sensing 
devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed 
area." In the roller skating operation, an individual is 
allowed to "skate for a period of time upon payment of 
cash," while parents and other onlookers may enter the 
skating facility and observe without charge. 
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the 
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission 
to determine whether the Galleria's activities would be 
subject to Utah sales tax. Kenneth Cook of the 
Auditing Division informed the Galleria that receipts 
from the batting cages and roller skating rink would be 
subject to tax, while, apparently, fees for bowling and 
miniature golf would not be. The Galleria then sought 
additional review. In August of 1984, George M. 
Loertscher of the Auditing Division informed the 
Galleria that roller skating, batting cages, miniature 
golf, and bowling were not subject to sales tax. 
Relying on Loertscher's letter, the Galleria did not 
collect sales tax on the activities identified. (FN3) 
When the Galleria subsequently added laser tag to its 
repertoire of amusements, it continued its consistent 
practice of not collecting sales tax on these activities. 
Some years later, the Auditing Division undertook a 
routine compliance audit. This time it was determined 
that the Galleria was required to collect an admission 
tax on fees collected for use of its batting cages, roller 
skating rink, and laser tag amusement, but not on the 
corresponding fees for bowling and miniature golf. 
The Galleria sought agency review of the assessment 
and the Tax Commission, in a decision dated 
November 20, 1991, held that fees for use of the 
batting cages, roller skating, and *998 laser game 
were payments for "admission" subject to sales tax. 
(FN4) The Galleria then sought reconsideration, and 
the Tax Commission denied that request by decision 
dated March 10, 1992. (FN5) The Galleria now seeks 
judicial review of the Tax Commission's determination 
that fees for the use of the batting cages, roller skating 
rink, and laser tag game are subject to Utah sales tax 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f) (1992). 
JURISDICTION 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must 
first determine whether the petition for judicial review 
was timely filed. The Tax Commission issued its final 
decision on November 20, 1991, and the Galleria 
petitioned the Commission for reconsideration on 
December 10. The Auditing Division filed its brief in 
opposition to reconsideration on January 3, 1992, and 
the Galleria replied on January 21. The Tax 
Commission issued its order denying the petition for 
reconsideration on March 10, 1992, and the Galleria 
filed its petition for judicial review within thirty days 
of that disposition. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) 
(1989), a request for administrative reconsideration is 
"deemed denied" if an order is not issued by the agency 
within twenty days after the filing of the request. (FN6 
) The Tax Commission did not issue its order denying 
reconsideration within twenty days of December 10, 
1991, but rather some three months later, on March 10, 
1992. Despite its own delay in disposing of the 
reconsideration request, the Tax Commission now 
argues that, under section 63-46b-13(3)(b), its order is 
deemed to have been issued on December 30, 1991, 
and the Galleria's petition for review is untimely 
because it was not filed within thirty days of that date, 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) 
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(1989). That provision states: 
A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final 
agency action within 30 days after the date that the 
order constituting the final agency action is issued or 
is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
Id. (emphasis added). The Tax Commission simply 
ignores the disjunctive term "or" found in section 
63-46b-14(3)(a) and interprets the statute to mean that 
if an order is not issued within the twenty day "deemed 
denied" period, the thirty-day jurisdictional clock for 
judicial review begins irretrievably to run. (FN7) 
*999 [1] We disagree. A plain reading of the statute 
indicates that a party may file a petition for judicial 
review within thirty days after the order constituting 
the final agency action, in this case the order denying 
reconsideration issued on March 10, 1992, "or " within 
thirty days after the "deemed denied" date established 
by section 63-46b-13(3)(b). In the instant case, the 
Galleria filed its petition for review within thirty days 
of the Tax Commission's March 10 final order and this 
court therefore has jurisdiction to hear the case. (FN8) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[2] Our analysis of tax cases is guided by the 
standards of review announced in Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-610 (Supp.1993). OSI Indus., Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 860 P.2d 381, 383 (Utah App. 1993) (because 
section 59-1-610 is procedural, it applies retroactively). 
See Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
860 P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1993) (applying section 
59-1-610 to a sales tax case involving an audit 
conducted between 1987 and 1989). But see Thorup 
Bros. Constr., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 324 
(Utah 1993). (FN9) Section 59-1-610 directs this 
court to 
grant the commission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error 
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion 
contained in a statute at issue before the appellate 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (Supp.1993) 
(emphasis added). This statute supersedes the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act insofar as it pertains to 
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Id. 
§ 59-1-610(2). Prior to the recent enactment of section 
59-1-610, it was the mandate of this court to determine 
whether the Legislature had, either explicitly or 
implicitly, granted an agency discretion and, if so, to 
review the agency action for reasonableness. Morton 
Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587-88 
(Utah 1991). See, e.g., SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1173 (Utah 1993) 
(Durham, J., dissenting); Nucor Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992). Section 
59-1-610 requires this court to depart from its prior 
practice and, in the case of the Tax Commission, to 
refrain from reviewing agency action under a 
deferential standard unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion. Since the statute at issue, section 59-12-103 
, does not contain language which would even arguably 
constitute an explicit grant of discretion to the Tax 
Commission, (FN 10) the commission's action in 
interpreting the scope of the sales tax on "admissions" 
must be reviewed without deference and for 
correctness. 
*1000 UTAH'S ADMISSION TAX 
Utah imposes a sales tax on the amount paid or 
charged by a purchaser for 
admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, 
or recreation, including seats and tables reserved or 
otherwise, and other similar accommodations^] 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f) (1992) (emphasis 
added). 
The Tax Commission has adopted rules interpreting 
the key language of the admission tax. Utah 
Administrative Code R865-19-33S(A) (1993) (FN11) 
specifically states in pertinent part: 
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter 
into a place. Admission includes the amount paid for 
the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an 
auditorium, theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, 
meeting house, or gymnasium to view any type of 
entertainment. Admission also includes the right to 
use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden 
whether such charge is designated as a cover charge, 
minimum charge, or any such similar charge. 
Aside from its elaboration on seats and tables, not 
applicable here, this rule speaks in terms of the right to 
enter a place and not in terms of a fee charged to use 
facilities or equipment within a place. As such, the rule 
merely incorporates the plain and settled meaning of 
"admission." See, e.g., Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 28 (1976) (defining admission 
disinter alia, "an act of admitting ...; permission or 
right to enter"). 
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[3][4] Neither the existence nor the content of the 
interpretive rule defining "admission" is meaningfully 
challenged in the instant proceeding. The single issue 
for us, then, is this: Assuming the rule reflects the 
correct interpretation of the statute, as seems 
inarguable, did the Tax Commission decide correctly 
that sales tax on admissions should be assessed on the 
fees charged by the Galleria for the use of batting 
cages, the roller rink, and laser tag? While the Tax 
Commission "recognizes that distinctions between 
[bowling and batting cages] are difficult to draw," 
(FN 12) we hold no meaningful distinction can be 
drawn for purposes of the admissions tax, given the 
Tax Commission's own interpretation of "admission." 
Not only does the record indicate no fee is charged 
for the right or privilege to enter the Galleria, but 
individuals such as coaches may enter the batting cage 
without paying an admission fee. The situation is 
apparently no different for laser tag or roller skating. 
Consequently, the Tax Commission erred in departing 
from its traditional application of the rule. The rule 
states that admission means the "right to enter a place." 
There is simply no fee charged by the Galleria for 
admission to any place; there are only fees charged to 
do particular things. (FN13) Thus, given the Tax 
Commission's own interpretation of the statute, as 
memorialized in its rule, its decision in this case is 
incorrect. 
*1001. CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission's decision that the Galleria is 
liable for an admission tax on the activities of roller 
skating, batting cages, and laser tag is therefore 
reversed. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
(FN1.) The applicable statute provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation, including seats and 
tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar 
accommodations[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f) (1992). 
The audit that resulted in the imposition of tax 
liability was for the period of July 1, 1986, through 
June 30, 1989. The substantive law then in effect 
governs this dispute. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). 
Nonetheless, both parties cite to the 1992 version of 
the Utah Code Annotated. That version is identical 
to the law in effect for the period from January 1, 
1987, to the present. However, between July 1, 1986, 
and January 1, 1987, the statutory language was more 
succinct and simply stated that the tax was due on any 
"amount paid for admission to any place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-15-4(l)(d) (Supp.1986). Since the instant 
case does not involve facts contemplated by the 
statutory language added as of January 1, 1987, we 
follow the parties' lead in citing the current version of 
the code. 
(FN2.) Laser tag was not offered when the Galleria 
first opened and has since been discontinued, but it 
was offered during the period of the audit. 
(FN3.) Equipment rental is a separate matter. The 
Galleria has routinely collected sales tax on the rental 
of bowling shoes and roller skates by those patrons 
who do not provide their own equipment. The 
taxability of such transactions is not in issue. 
(FN4.) Because of the conflicting advice provided by 
the Auditing Division, the Tax Commission held that 
the Galleria would not be liable for the tax due on the 
roller skating and batting cage receipts during the 
period of the audit, but only prospectively. 
The Tax Commission now argues that because the tax 
is not being assessed against roller skating and 
batting cage receipts for the audit period, the issue is 
moot and any decision on the future taxability of 
those receipts is simply an advisory opinion. We 
disagree. "A case is deemed moot when the 
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants." Burkett v. Schwendiman, 111 P.2d 42, 44 
(Utah 1989). A determination by this court will 
affect the rights of the litigants. Furthermore, the 
issue has been fully briefed and is squarely before us. 
It is clear the real dispute has always been whether 
the tax is applicable to these activities, not simply 
whether the tax is due for any particular period. 
(FN5.) In its order denying reconsideration, the 
Commission explicitly recognized that the distinction 
between taxing batting cages and bowling was 
difficult to draw and that the disparate treatment 
might not exist if a new look at the bowling issue 
were undertaken. In a letter dated August 7, 1986, 
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Jim Roger, then Director of the Auditing Division, 
recognized that "[t]he Auditing Division has for quite 
some time had some questions about which activities 
come under the definition of an admission." 
(FN6.) The "deemed denied" provision states in its 
entirety: 
If the agency head or the person designated for that 
purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after 
the filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989). 
(FN7.) In the Tax Commission's view, the parties' 
briefs filed with and accepted by the commission in 
January of 1992 were for naught, although accepted 
by the commission when tendered, because they were 
filed more than twenty days after December 10, and 
the commission's multiple page order of denial, 
issued weeks later, was a completely meaningless 
gesture. 
(FN8.) We note that Lopez v. Career Services Review 
Board, 834 P.2d 568, 571-72 (Utah App.), cert 
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), relied on by the 
Tax Commission, does not support its position. The 
Lopez court was concerned with the legal significance 
of a letter issued within the twenty day "deemed 
denied" period of § 63-46b-13(3)(b) and whether it 
qualified as an order so as to start the thirty-day 
jurisdictional time then, rather than upon the elapse 
of twenty days. The instant case presents a 
completely different question because the agency's 
final order was issued well beyond the twenty-day 
period. 
*1001_ (FN9.) In Thorup, decided after both OS1 and 
Miller Welding, the Supreme Court reviewed whether 
the Tax Commission's action was contrary to one of 
the commission's rules under a reasonableness and 
rationality standard, citing the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act. Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) 
(1989). It is unclear from the decision, since Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-610 was not mentioned, whether 
the new statute was simply not considered by the 
Court or whether the Court decided it was 
inapplicable, either by its terms or because the Court 
does not subscribe to the retroactivity conclusion of 
OS! and Miller Welding. In the face of such 
ambiguity, it is prudent to follow the clear holdings of 
the previous decisions of this court. See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). 
(FN 10.) The case law indicates that where the Tax 
Commission has been held to have discretion in the 
interpretation and application of the sales tax statute, 
that delegation is implicit. Compare Union Pac. R.R. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 884-85 (Utah 
1992) (decided before the adoption of § 59-1-610 and 
finding a grant of discretion without stating whether it 
is explicit or implicit) with SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1175-76 (Utah 
1993) (Durham, J., dissenting) (finding implicit 
delegation to interpret terms within Utah's sales tax 
statute). See also Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). 
(FN11.) We cite to the most recent version of the Utah 
Administrative Code as a convenience to the reader. 
The portions of the rules quoted in this opinion were 
the same, in all material respects, throughout the 
audit period. 
(FN12.) The Tax Commission, as admitted in the 
order denying the petition for reconsideration in this 
case, has consistently taken the position that bowling 
is not subject to the sales tax on admission fees. Nor 
have fees for golfing, tennis, racquetball, miniature 
golf, or driving ranges been subject to the tax. The 
Tax Commission's application of its rule vis-a-vis 
bowling and these other activities appears to be 
correct because no admission fee is customarily 
charged for the "right or privilege to enter," for 
instance, a bowling alley. 
(FN 13.) Language in another rule, which rule is 
vigorously challenged by the Galleria, defines "place 
of amusement." That rule has verbiage consistent 
with the Tax Commission's position. See Utah 
Admin.Code R865-19-34S (1993) ("sale of a ticket 
for a ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device 
is an admission to a place of amusement"). However, 
given the scheme of § 59-12-103(l)(f), the meaning 
of the terms "place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation" becomes relevant only if the threshold 
determination of an "admission" had been shown. 
Thus, because we hold the fees charged by the 
Galleria for use of the batting cages, etc., are not for 
admission, we need not go on to decide whether those 
venues qualify as "place[s] of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation." 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
HARPER INVESTMENTS, INC., Harper Sand 
and Gravel, Inc., 
Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper Contracting, 
Inc., Petitioners, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, Respondent. 
No. 920310. 
Feb. 2, 1994. 
Sand and gravel companies appealed decision of 
State Tax Commission assessing sales taxes. The 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) fact 
that companies filed request for judicial review of 
decision more than 30 days from date of decision did 
not compel finding that request was not timely, where 
Commission had granted extension of time for 
petitioning for reconsideration of decision and 
taxpayers had petitioned for judicial review within 30 
days of granting of extension; (2) fact that 
Commission took no action for over 20 days on 
companies' petition for reconsideration of decision did 
not compel finding that 30-day period for seeking 
judicial review of decision began 20 days after petition 
was filed, where Commission ultimately issued order 
denying petition for reconsideration; and (3) sales 
taxes were improperly assessed for purported sale of 
sand and gravel between companies, since purported 
sales existed in accounting records but had no basis in 
reality, and resulted from good faith error in 
accounting methods. 
Reversed. 
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Taxation <§=> 1319 
371 — 
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts 
Taxes 
371XVI(C) Assessment, Payment, and Enforcement 
371XVI(C)1 Levy and Assessment 
371kl319 Judicial Review and Relief Against 
Assessments. 
Fact that taxpayers filed request for judicial review of 
State Tax Commission decision assessing sales taxes 
more than 30 days from date of Commission's decision 
did not compel finding that request was not timely, 
where Commission had granted extension of time for 
Page 1 
petitioning for reconsideration of decision and 
taxpayers petitioned for judicial review within 30 days 
after Commission issued order denying petition for 
reconsideration; granting of extension operated to 
extend date on which agency decision became "final" 
by tolling 30-day period for seeking judicial review. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-1-610, 63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-13(l)(a, 
b), 63-46b-14, 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
[2] Taxation <S=> 1318 
371 — 
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts 
Taxes 
371XVI(C) Assessment, Payment, and Enforcement 
371XVI(C)1 Levy and Assessment 
371kl318 Administrative Review. 
Fact that State Tax Commission took no action for 
over 20 days on taxpayers' petition for reconsideration 
of decision assessing sales taxes did not compel 
finding, under statute providing that such petition is 
deemed denied if no action is taken by Commission 
within 20 days, that 30-day period for seeking judicial 
review of decision assessing sales taxes began 20 days 
after petition was filed, where Commission ultimately 
issued order denying petition for reconsideration; 
actual date of issuance of order marked beginning of 
30-day period. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b), 
63-46b-14(3)(a). 
[3] Taxation <®=> 1234 
371 — 
371'XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts 
Taxes 
371XVI(B) Tax Liability and Exemptions 
371XVI(B)1 Transactions Taxable in General 
371kl234 Nature of Transaction in General. 
Sales taxes were improperly assessed for purported 
sales of sand and gravel which existed in accounting 
records but had no basis in reality; following parent 
company's restructuring in which its assets were 
transferred to three wholly owned subsidiaries, good 
faith accounting error resulted in a sale being 
erroneously reflected every time material was 
transferred from one subsidiary to another. 
*814 Robert A. Peterson, Richard C. Skeen, and 
Robert W. Payne, Salt Lake City, for petitioners. 
Jan Graham, Arty. Gen. and Clark L. Snelson, Asst. 
Arty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Harper Investments, Inc., Harper Sand and Gravel, 
Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper Contracting, 
Utah State Tax Com'n, (Utah 1994) 
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Inc. (collectively referred to as "Harper Companies"), 
appeal from a decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Commission") that assessed them 
$582,273.93 in sales taxes arising from the sale of sand 
and gravel. The Harper Companies argue that this 
assessment was in error because it did not arise from 
actual sales, but from an erroneous in-house accounting 
treatment of the transactions in question. We agree and 
reverse. 
The material facts are not in dispute. Harper 
Excavating, Inc., operated a business involving 
excavating, cleaning, hauling, and distributing sand, 
gravel, and other materials. In 1986, for reasons not 
relevant here, Harper Excavating restructured by 
transferring its assets to three new wholly owned 
subsidiaries-Harper Sand and Gravel, Harper 
Investments, (FN1) and Harper Contracting. Harper 
Excavating, the new parent corporation, later changed 
its name to Harper Investments. 
These corporate changes required a restructuring of 
the manner in which the new group of companies 
accounted for transactions with third parties and among 
themselves. Controller Steven Goddard, who was 
solely responsible for setting up the new accounting 
procedures, distributed on the books the various assets 
owned by the former Harper Excavating to the three 
subsidiaries. Goddard thought he was distributing 
these assets in accordance with underlying legal and 
physical realities. However, he erred. He accounted 
one of those assets, a group of sand and gravel sales 
agreements, as property of Harper Sand and Gravel. In 
fact, the sales contracts had already been assigned to 
Harper Contracting. As a result of this error, every 
time material covered by those contracts was delivered 
by Harper Contracting, the books reflected a sale from 
Harper Sand and Gravel to Harper Contracting. The 
Harper Companies did not discover Goddard's error 
until the Commission reviewed the companies' books in 
1988 and assessed liability for unpaid taxes on "intra-
unit" sales. 
The Commission gave notice of the tax deficiencies 
on September 28, 1990. On October 26, 1990, the 
Harper Companies petitioned for redetermination, and 
a hearing was held on July 30, 1991. On January 9, 
1992, the Commission issued findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a final decision affirming the 
original sales tax assessment. Although the decision 
affected each individual company, a copy was mailed 
only to Harper Investments in care of its counsel, Van 
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy. None of the 
four individual petitioners or their counsel received a 
copy of the decision until February 20th, forty-two 
days after it was issued. As a result, the twenty-day 
period provided in the Code for filing a petition for 
reconsideration had expired. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-13(l)(a). The Harper Companies then sought 
an extension *815 of time within which to file their 
petition for reconsideration. That extension was 
granted under authority of section 63-46b-l(9), and the 
Harper Companies filed a petition for reconsideration 
on May 4, 1992. The Commission, however, denied 
the petition in a final order dated June 3, 1992. The 
Harper Companies filed a petition for review of agency 
action with this court on July 1, 1992, claiming that the 
Commission erred in assessing sales taxes that were 
based solely on a good faith error in an accounting 
procedure. 
We first address the standard of review. The 
Commission's decision raises questions of law. "We 
grant the Commission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law, applying a correction-of-error 
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion 
contained in a statute at issue before the appellate 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (Supp.1993) 
; see also Board of Equalization v. State Tax Comm fn 
ex rel Benchmark, Inc., 864 P.2d 882, 884 (1993) 
(holding that section 59-1-610 applies to actions 
commenced before its effective date). The statutes at 
issue do not grant the Commission any discretion in 
their interpretation. See 49th Street Galleria v. Tax 
Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
("[S]ection 59-12-103[ ] does not contain language 
which would even arguably constitute an explicit grant 
of discretion to the Tax Commission...."). Therefore, 
the no-deference standard applies. 
[1] The Commission asserts that the Harper 
Companies missed the statutory deadline for obtaining 
judicial review under section 63-46b-14. That 
provision requires a request for review to be made 
within thirty days from the date the agency decision is 
issued or deemed to have been issued. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a). Because the final decision was 
dated January 9, 1992, and review was not sought until 
July 1, 1992, the Commission claims that section 
63-46b-14 bars our consideration of the matter. The 
Commission further argues that it did not extend the 
time limit for seeking judicial review when it granted 
an extension of time for filing a petition for 
reconsideration. For this argument, the Commission 
relies on section 63-46b-l(9), which provides, 
"Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a 
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from 
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in 
this chapter, except those time periods established for 
judicial review." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). 
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We do not agree with the Commission's position. 
The Commission did not purport to extend the thirty-
day limit for seeking judicial review. Rather, it 
extended the time for petitioning for reconsideration. 
The Code allows a petitioner to seek reconsideration of 
an agency decision within twenty days or to seek 
immediate judicial review within thirty days of a final 
decision and forego any further agency action. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13(l)(a)-(b), -14(3)(a). In this 
case, the Harper Companies sought a "good cause" 
extension of time to seek reconsideration, which the 
Commission granted. This extension operated to 
extend the date on which the agency decision became 
"final" by tolling the thirty-day period for seeking 
judicial review. Because the Commission did not deny 
the petition for reconsideration until June 3, 1992, we 
conclude that the July 1st filing for judicial review was 
timely. 
[2] In the alternative, the Commission argues that the 
Harper Companies were tardy in seeking judicial 
review because the Code provides that a petition for 
reconsideration is "deemed denied" if no action is 
taken by the agency within twenty days of the petition. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b). The 
Commission claims that the thirty-day period for 
seeking judicial review began to run on May 25, 1992, 
twenty days from the day on which the Harper 
Companies petitioned for reconsideration. As a result, 
the Commission argues, the July 1st filing for judicial 
review was past the thirty-day period. 
This issue was specifically addressed in 49th Street 
Galleria, 860 P.2d at 998-99. There, the court of 
appeals held that a petition for judicial review was 
timely filed because the agency involved had issued an 
order denying reconsideration after the twenty-day 
"deemed denied" period. Id. at 999. The court noted 
that section 63-46b-14(3)(a) allows a party to file a 
petition for judicial *816 review within thirty days 
after the date on which an order was issued or was 
considered to have been issued. Id. The court found 
that if an agency chooses to issue an order denying a 
petition for reconsideration after the twenty-day 
presumptive denial period, the actual date of issuance 
would mark the beginning of the thirty-day time period. 
Id. 
We agree with the court of appeals' interpretation of 
section 63-46b-14(3)(a). When the Harper Companies 
chose not to file their petition for review within the 
twenty-day period, they assumed the risk that there 
would be no order from the Commission. They would 
have missed the deadline if the Commission had never 
issued its final decision of June 3, 1992. However, 
because the Commission chose to consider the petition 
for reconsideration and to act on it by issuing an order, 
the period for seeking review did not begin to run until 
the date of that final opinion. As a result, once the 
order was issued, the Harper Companies had an 
additional thirty days to file, and they did so. 
[3] We now turn to the Harper Companies' argument 
that the Commission wrongly assessed a sales tax on 
transactions that were reflected in the accounting 
records but did not have any legal reality. The Harper 
Companies argue that the underlying facts of 
ownership should govern, not the manner in which the 
transactions were accounted for, at least when, as here, 
the accounting was a result of an indisputably good 
faith error by the accountant. We agree. As the United 
States Supreme Court has observed, accounting records 
"are no more than evidential, being neither 
indispensable nor conclusive. The decision must rest 
upon the actual facts." Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 
247 U.S. 179, 187, 38 S.Ct. 467, 470, 62 L.Ed. 1054 
(1918). In apparent recognition of this principle, even 
the Commission's final decision found that the sand and 
gravel sales contracts had been "mistakenly assigned" 
to Harper Sand and Gravel. Therefore, there is no 
dispute on the record that the accounting records were 
prepared in good faith but reflected a transaction that 
did not exist. We therefore hold that the Commission 
cannot assess a sales tax on those nonexistent 
transactions. 
Reversed. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J., and 
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, 
concur. 
HALL, J., does not participate herein; BENCH, 
Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
HOWE, Justice, dissenting: 
I dissent. The majority has misinterpreted the 
legislative intent as to the deadline for filing a petition 
for judicial review of the Tax Commission's final 
action. 
Section 63-46b-13 provides that any party may timely 
request reconsideration of an agency's order. I agree 
with the majority that Harper did that here. If 
reconsideration is not granted, the party may seek 
judicial review. In order to move along the 
reconsideration process, the legislature provided in 
section 63-46b-13(3)(b) that "if the agency head or the 
person designated for that purpose does not issue an 
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order within twenty days after the filing of the request, 
the request for reconsideration shall be considered to 
be denied." Thus, if no agency action has been taken 
on the request for reconsideration within twenty days, 
the statute automatically makes the request denied. 
The next step for an aggrieved party would be to file 
a petition for judicial review of the agency action. 
Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) provides that this filing must 
be done "within thirty days after the date that the order 
constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b)." The majority misconstrues the 
intent of this statute. It erroneously interprets the 
statute as starting the thirty days' appeal time to run 
from either the date on which the agency denies the 
request for reconsideration or the date on which it is 
considered denied under subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b), 
whichever is later. This interpretation makes no sense 
and defeats the legislative intent of expediting the 
administrative process. The reasonable interpretation 
is that the thirty days for filing a petition for judicial 
review begin to run when the agency denies the request 
for reconsideration, *817. but if the agency has not 
done so within twenty days, the request is considered 
denied at that time and the appeal time starts running. 
The majority's interpretation produces the anomalous 
result that when an agency does not act on a request for 
reconsideration within twenty days, it is considered to 
be denied, but at any time thereafter (and apparently 
without any outside limit) the agency may act on the 
request, thereby breathing life into the case, and start 
running again the thirty days to seek judicial review. I 
submit that this interpretation is without parallel 
anywhere in our statutes or rules of practice in any 
other context. The majority cites no authority for its 
interpretation. On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa in Ford Motor Co. v. Iowa Department of 
Transportation Regulations Board, 282 N.W.2d 701 
(Iowa 1979), was presented with the identical question. 
There, the Administrative Procedure Act provided that 
an application for rehearing shall be "deemed to have 
been denied" unless the agency grants the application 
within twenty days after its filing. Id. at 702-03. A 
further rule provided that a petition for judicial review 
must be filed within thirty days after the application for 
rehearing has been denied or deemed denied. The 
court held that the agency must act on the application 
for rehearing, if at all, within twenty days. If it has not 
done so, the application for rehearing is deemed denied 
and the appeal time starts to run and cannot be 
restarted by a subsequent denial of the application by 
the agency. In its opinion, the court wrote: 
Parties to the proceedings have a need for and a right 
to a prompt disposition of a dispute. We are 
confident that the legislature was fully aware that 
administrative agencies might meet irregularly. 
Hence, in the interest of a prompt disposition of 
disputes, the legislature superimposed an automatic 
denial of any application not ruled upon within the 
prescribed period. 
Regrettable hardships may well result to litigants 
who are unaware of the "deemed denied" provisions 
of the statute. But it is in the overall interest of 
litigants and the public at large that administrative 
proceedings move to a prompt conclusion. The 
legislature obviously had the broader public interest 
in mind in adopting the statute. 
Id. at 703. The same result was reached in Davis v. 
Alabama Medicaid Agency, 519 So.2d 538 
(Ala.Civ.App.1987). There, a statute provided that an 
aggrieved party may file an application for rehearing 
with an agency within fifteen days after entry of its 
order. It was further provided that if the agency enters 
no order regarding the application within thirty days, 
the application shall be deemed denied. A petition for 
judicial review was required to be filed within thirty 
days after the decision on the request for rehearing is 
rendered. The court held that once the thirty days had 
run from the filing of the application for rehearing, the 
time to appeal began to run and could not be altered or 
extended by the agency's subsequent denial of the 
application for rehearing. Id. at 539. 
The majority creates a dilemma for an aggrieved 
party who desires to seek judicial review. If the party 
has requested reconsideration by the administrative 
agency but no action has been taken on the request by 
the end of twenty days, an appeal must then be filed. 
If, however, the agency later (and there is no limitation 
as to how much later) acts on the request and denies it, 
the appeal which has been taken turns out to be 
premature and must be dismissed. The party must then 
file a second appeal, supposedly pay another filing fee, 
and continue pursuit of the appeal. In no other context 
in our appellate system do we tolerate such uncertainty 
as to when an order is final and appealable and subject 
a party seeking review to such a duplicative and 
hazardous procedure. 
I would dismiss the appeal as having been filed 
untimely. 
(FN1.) Harper Investments later changed its name to 
Harper Excavating. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES, INC., Petitioner, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and 
Vicky Ann McCord, Respondents. 
Nos. 920206-CA, 910413-CA. 
Sept. 7, 1993. 
Employer petitioned for review of decisions of the 
Industrial Commission in an antidiscrimination 
hearing. The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., held 
that: (1) the employer's failure to petition the Industrial 
Commission for review of ALJ's decision barred 
judicial review; (2) the initial petition for judicial 
review did not divest the Commission of continuing 
jurisdiction over the case; (3) the employer's petitions 
for administrative review were not timely; and (4) the 
employer failed to show good cause needed to obtain 
extensions of the time for seeking administrative 
review. 
Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed in part; and 
remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error <S^782 
30 — 
30XIII Dismissal, Withdrawal, or Abandonment 
30k779 Grounds for Dismissal 
30k782 Want of Jurisdiction. 
Court of Appeals must dismiss case if it does not 
have jurisdiction, regardless of which party raises 
issue. 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure <S^229 
15A — 
15AIII Separation of Administrative and Other 
Powers 
15AIII(B) Judicial Powers 
15Ak228 Primary Jurisdiction; Judicial Remedies 
Prior to or Pending Administrative 
Proceedings 
15Ak229 Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 
Basic purpose underlying doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is to allow agency to perform 
functions within its special competence~to make 
factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its 
own errors so as to moot judicial controversies. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-14(2). 
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure <®=::>229 
15A — 
15AIII Separation of Administrative and Other 
Powers 
15AIII(B) Judicial Powers 
15Ak228 Primary Jurisdiction; Judicial Remedies 
Prior to or Pending Administrative 
Proceedings 
15Ak229 Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 
Exceptions to doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies exist if there is chance that 
irreparable injury would occur as result of requiring 
exhaustion or if exhaustion would serve no useful 
purpose. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-14(2)(a,b). 
[4] Administrative Law and Procedure <S^229 
15A — 
15AIII Separation of Administrative and Other 
Powers 
15AIII(B) Judicial Powers 
15Ak228 Primary Jurisdiction; Judicial Remedies 
Prior to or Pending Administrative 
Proceedings 
15Ak229 Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 
[See headnote text below] 
[4] Civil Rights <@=>444 
78 — 
78III State Remedies 
78k442 State or Local Administrative Agencies and 
Proceedings 
78k444 Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Before Resort to Courts. 
Under principle of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, employer's failure to petition Industrial 
Commission for review of ALJ's decision in 
antidiscrimination hearing barred judicial review. 
U.C.A.1953, 34-35-7.1(11), (ll)(a, b), (12), 
63-46b-14(2)(a,b). 
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure <®==>229 
15A — 
15AIII Separation of Administrative and Other 
Powers 
15AIII(B) Judicial Powers 
15Ak228 Primary Jurisdiction; Judicial Remedies 
Prior to or Pending Administrative 
Proceedings 
15Ak229 Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Civil Rights <S=^443 
78 — 
78III State Remedies 
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78k442 State or Local Administrative Agencies and 
Proceedings 
78k443 Jurisdiction and Authority. 
Employer's initial appeal taken before it exhausted 
administrative remedies by petitioning Industrial 
Commission for review of ALJ's decision in 
antidiscrimination hearing did not divest Commission 
of continuing jurisdiction over employee's case. 
U.C.A.1953, 34-35-7.1(11), (ll)(a, b), (12), 
63-46b-14(2)(a, b). 
[6] Administrative Law and Procedure ^ ^ 722.1 
15A—-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(C) Proceedings for Review 
15 Ak722 Time for Proceedings 
15Ak722.1 In General. 
Civil rule giving three-day extension of time to take 
action if notice of required action has been served by 
mail does not apply to Administrative Procedure Act's 
(APA) deadlines for seeking administrative review. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-12(l)(a), (l)(b)(iv); Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 6(e). 
[7] Administrative Law and Procedure <®==?722.1 
15A—-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(C) Proceedings for Review 
15Ak722 Time for Proceedings 
15Ak722.1 In General. 
"Filing," as used in Administrative Procedure Act's 
(APA) deadlines for seeking administrative review, 
requires actual delivery of necessary documents to 
agency within 30-day time limit; mailing within that 
time limit is insufficient. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 6(e). 
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure <®==>723 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(C) Proceedings for Review 
15Ak722 Time for Proceedings 
15Ak723 Effect of Delay. 
[See headnote text below] 
[8] Civil Rights <@=>447 
78-— 
78III State Remedies 
78k442 State or Local Administrative Agencies and 
Proceedings 
78k447 Judicial Review and Enforcement of 
Administrative Decisions. 
Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably in 
denying extension of time for employer to petition for 
review of ALJ's decision in antidiscrimination hearing, 
absent any articulation by employer of facts upon 
which to determine good cause for failure to comply 
with deadline for administrative review. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-16(4), (4)(h)(iv). 
[9] Administrative Law and Procedure <®==>481 
15A — 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15 Ak480 Rehearing 
15Ak481 Necessity and Purpose. 
[See headnote text below] 
[9] Civil Rights <®^>446 
78 — 
78III State Remedies 
78k442 State or Local Administrative Agencies and 
Proceedings 
78k446 Hearing, Determination, and Relief; Costs 
and Fees. 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not 
authorize employer to file more than one request for 
reconsideration of decision of Industrial Commission 
to deny extension of time for employer to petition for 
review of ALJ's decision in antidiscrimination hearing. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-16(4), (4)(h)(iv). 
[10] Civil Rights <@==>446 
78 — 
78III State Remedies 
78k442 State or Local Administrative Agencies and 
Proceedings 
78k446 Hearing, Determination, and Relief; Costs 
and Fees. 
Employee was entitled to recover attorney fees she 
incurred on employer's unsuccessful appeals from 
ALJ's decision in antidiscrimination hearing; employer 
attempted to obtain judicial review without exhausting 
admimstrative remedies and sought to obtain reversal 
of decisions denying extensions of time to meet filing 
deadlines. U.C.A.1953, 34-35-7.1(9). 
*945 Ronald C. Barker, Mitchell R. Barker, David 
G. Cundick, Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Gen. Counsel, Sharon J. Eblen, 
Indus. Com'n of Utah, Salt Lake City, for respondent 
Indus. Com'n of Utah. 
James W. Stewart, Lisa A. Jones, Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent McCord. 
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I 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
AMENDED OPINION (FN1) 
Maverik Country Stores brings separate appeals from 
two decisions of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
The first appeal is from the Industrial Commission's 
determination that Maverik violated Utah Code Ann. § 
§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1988 & Supp.1993), the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act, in its treatment of Vicky Ann 
McCord. The second appeal is from the Industrial 
Commission's ruling that Maverik's request for agency 
review was untimely. We dismiss the first appeal and 
affirm the ruling in the second. We remand for 
assessment of attorney fees. 
FACTS 
Ms. Jones, a Maverik store manager, hired Ms. 
McCord as a convenience store clerk on September 30, 
1988. (FN2) McCord worked six hour shifts, four 
days a week at $3.35 per hour during her two weeks of 
part-time employment. While at work on October 14, 
1988, McCord experienced tightness in her chest and 
asked Jones if she could go to the hospital. The doctor 
at the hospital indicated McCord's heart was fine. 
McCord subsequently called Jones and offered to 
finish her shift. Jones told her to stay home and rest. 
While talking to McCord later that day, Jones stated 
her mother had died from heart problems and her son 
had recently had open heart surgery. She expressed 
concern over the seriousness of McCord's heart 
problems and indicated she would be afraid to leave 
McCord in the store alone. Jones then terminated 
McCord's employment. 
McCord had answered "no" to an inquiry on the 
employment application regarding whether she had any 
heart problems which would limit her ability to 
perform the job. She did have a condition known as 
mitral *946 valve prolapse which the parties 
stipulated was a "usually benign condition." A doctor 
examined McCord after she was terminated and found 
employment posed no risk to her. 
Jones subsequently filled out a company form, a 
Record of Employee Counseling, describing the event 
and indicating she was very concerned McCord's heart 
problem would reoccur if she continued her job with 
Maverik. In a later letter to the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division (UADD), Jones again focused 
on her concern about a stress related reoccurrence. At 
the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ) 
on the discrimination claim, Jones mentioned some 
additional factors for the termination. These were 
McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump meters and 
allegations that McCord smelled of alcohol at work. 
These factors, however, were never discussed in the 
termination interview nor noted on the termination 
form. 
McCord subsequently sought employment at 
numerous locations from 1989 to 1991. She worked 
for a short time as a janitor at an elementary school but 
was forced to quit due to an unrelated illness. 
McCord filed a complaint alleging a violation of the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act with the UADD on 
October 24, 1988. The UADD found for McCord in 
an Order issued January 24, 1991. Maverik requested 
a formal hearing before an ALJ. The hearing was held 
on May 15, 1991. The ALJ issued findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on June 26, 1991. The ALJ's June 
26, 1991 decision included a specific reservation of the 
issue of appropriate attorney fees. On September 10, 
1991, the ALJ issued a Supplemental Order disposing 
of the issue of attorney fees. 
On July 26, 1991, Maverik filed a Writ of Review 
with this court (first appeal). The first appeal is from 
the ALJ's Order of June 26, 1991. On August 26, 
1991, McCord and the Industrial Commission filed 
motions to dismiss the first appeal based on Maverik's 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of a 
final order. On September 16, 1991, this court ordered 
those motions deferred, and requested the parties 
include arguments on those issues in their briefs on the 
merits. 
Despite its pending appeal, M'averik then filed a 
Request for Review by the Industrial Commission of 
the ALJ's June 26, 1991 and September 10, 1991 
Orders. The date the request was filed is unclear. 
Counsel for Maverik signed and dated the request 
October 10, 1991. The request has two received dates 
stamped on it, October 11, 1991 and October 15, 1991. 
In later orders referring to the request, the Industrial 
Commission refers to both dates as the day it received 
the request. For the purposes of our review, we assume 
the request was received October 11, 1991. 
On February 28, 1992, the Industrial Commission 
denied Maverik's Request for Review based on its 
untimeliness. (FN3) On March 19, 1992, Maverik 
filed a request with the Industrial Commission to 
reconsider its denial of the Request for Review. On 
March 30, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied 
Maverik's Request for Reconsideration. In this denial, 
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the Industrial Commission recognized it could have 
allowed the late Request for Review if Maverik had 
shown good cause for extension of the time period. 
The Industrial Commission ruled, however, that 
Maverik had failed to show good cause for the 
extension. 
On April 3, 1992, Maverik filed a "Limited Request 
for Reconsideration" in which it finally attempted to 
show good cause for its late filing of the original 
Request for Review. The Industrial Commission did 
not respond to this unique motion. On April 7, 1992, 
Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this court (second 
appeal). The second appeal is from the Industrial 
Commission's Order Denying Review and Order 
Denying Request For Reconsideration. 
*947 I. THE FIRST APPEAL-EXHAUSTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
[1] As a threshold matter, we must determine whether 
we have jurisdiction over the first appeal. Regardless 
of who raises the issue, we must dismiss a case if we 
determine we do not have jurisdiction. Silva v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 786 P.2d 246, 247 
(Utah App. 1990) (per curiam); see also Thompson v. 
Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App.1987) (per 
curiam). "When a matter is outside the court's 
jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the 
action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreawc, 767 P.2d 
569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). 
[2] [3] The basic purpose underlying the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies "is to allow an 
administrative agency to perform functions within its 
special competence~to make a factual record, to apply 
its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot 
judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 
34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972); see 
also Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 316 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah 1957) (recognizing 
correction rationale). Exceptions to the doctrine exist. 
For example, in instances where there is a chance that 
irreparable injury would occur if exhaustion was 
required or where requiring exhaustion would serve no 
useful purpose, the doctrine will not be applied. See 
Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 
1989); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(a) & 
(b)(1989). 
In this case, Maverik appealed directly to this court 
thirty days after the ALJ's ruling. The Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act provides that following the 
issuance of an order after a formal hearing pursuant to 
the Act "either party may file a written request for 
review of the order ... in accordance with Section 
63-46b-12." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1 l)(a) 
(Supp.1993). This allows parties to an anti-
discrimination hearing to take advantage of the general 
UAPA agency review process. If no timely review is 
filed "the order by the presiding officer becomes the 
final order of the commission." Id. § 34-35-7.1(1 l)(b). 
This section provides that the Industrial Commission 
need not act on the ALJ's order in any way for that 
order to take effect. Thus, on the day Maverik filed its 
petition for review the ALJ's order was a final 
enforceable order of the Industrial Commission. 
[4] The next subsection of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act, however, requires an aggrieved party to file for 
agency review under subsection 11(a) or lose the 
opportunity for judicial review. (FN4) That 
subsection provides: "An order of the commission 
under Subsection (ll)(a) is subject to judicial review 
as provided in Section 63-46b-16." Id. § 
34-35-7.1(12) (emphasis added). Subsection 12 could 
have easily provided that a final order underSubsection 
11 was subject to judicial review under UAPA. The 
clear import of the legislature's omission of orders final 
under subsection 11(b) is that they are not subject to 
judicial review. Subsection 12 simply embodies the 
general principle that a party must exhaust its 
administrative remedies prior to obtaining judicial 
review. Therefore, a party adversely affected by an 
order of an ALJ in an anti-discrimination hearing 
cannot obtain judicial review of that order until it has 
been subject to administrative review. Cf. Hi-Country 
Homeowners Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 
682 (Utah 1989) (holding Utah Code Ann. § 
54-7-15(2)(b) required application for rehearing prior 
to judicial appeal). 
Furthermore, the principle of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is apparently embodied in the 
general provisions of UAPA. One section provides: 
"A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting 
all administrative remedies available...." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1989) (emphasis added). This 
provides additional *948 support for our decision. 
(FN5) We have no jurisdiction over the first appeal 
and have no choice but to dismiss it. (FN6) 
II. THE SECOND APPEAL 
A. Industrial Commission's Jurisdiction 
[5] Maverik contends the filing of the first appeal, 
regardless of its timeliness, divested the Industrial 
Commission of jurisdiction to continue to act in the 
case. Thus, according to Maverik, every action taken 
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( 
by the Industrial Commission after the ALJ's June 26 
Order is a nullity. Maverik would have us remand to 
the Industrial Commission for entry of the 
Supplemental Order on attorney fees and the agency 
appeals process. Maverik does not provide any 
relevant authority supporting this contention. 
Other courts have consistently recognized an appeal 
from a non-final order does not divest the 
administrative tribunal of jurisdiction. For example, in 
Fiebig v. Wheat Ridge Regional Center, 782 P.2d 814 
(Colo.App.),c6?Y. denied, (Colo. Oct. 2, 1989), the 
court held an untimely petition for judicial review did 
not divest the agency of jurisdiction to act. Id. at 816. 
In Fiebig, an employee appealed his termination to the 
State Personnel Board. The Board referred the 
complaint to a hearing officer who ruled the allegations 
of sexual misconduct against the employee were 
without merit. The hearing officer, however, upheld 
the termination on the grounds the employee could no 
longer perform his job due to the allegations. Both 
parties appealed the decision to the Board. The Board 
ruled the hearing officer's findings were insufficient 
and remanded the case to the officer for a new hearing. 
The employer appealed the Board's ruling to the court 
of appeals. Subsequently, the hearing the Board 
ordered was held and the hearing officer ruled in favor 
of the employee. The employer filed a motion with the 
Board to declare the hearing officer's order invalid on 
the grounds the appeal to the court eliminated the 
agency's jurisdiction. The Board denied the motion. 
The court of appeals upheld the Board's ruling because 
"an appeal to a court without jurisdiction does not 
divest the agency of jurisdiction to proceed with the 
action on the merits." Id. at 816. Accord Northwest 
Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 241 
Kan. 165, 735 P.2d 241 (1987). 
Similarly, we have recognized a notice of appeal filed 
while a trial court is considering a proper post-
judgment motion does not confer jurisdiction on this 
court. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 
520, 523 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 
(Utah May 14, 1993). We reasoned "to permit an 
appeal would be an affront to judicial economy" 
because allowing the trial *949 court to dispose of the 
motion might eliminate needless appeals and 
discourage pointless delay. Id. See also Williams v. 
City of Valdez, 603 P.2d 483, 488 (Alaska 1979) 
(holding appeal brought from non-final order of a trial 
court does not divest court of jurisdiction); Knox v. 
Dick, 99 Nev. 514, 665 P.2d 267, 269 (Nev.1983) 
(holding "appeal from a non-appealable order does not 
divest the trial court of jurisdiction"). Likewise here, 
allowing an untimely appeal to divest the agency of 
jurisdiction creates the possibility of multiple appeals 
and needless delays. 
Under the rule for which Maverik argues, a party who 
prematurely appeals an agency decision could unjustly 
delay further agency action. The rationale behind 
allowing continuing jurisdiction in the agency 
following an appeal from a non-final order applies with 
equal force to allow continuing jurisdiction where the 
action is subject to further administrative review. We 
thus follow our sister jurisdictions and conclude 
appeals from agency orders subject to further 
administrative review do not divest the agency of 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Industrial Commission had 
jurisdiction to act after the first appeal was filed. 
B. Timeliness 
McCord and the Industrial Commission argue we 
should dismiss the second appeal because Maverik's 
Request for Review of the Final Order of the ALJ was 
untimely. Maverik responds its request was timely 
because either (1) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) 
gives it three extra days to file the appeal, (2) the filing 
date is the date of mailing or, (3) the Industrial 
Commission abused its discretion in failing to extend 
the filing deadline by one day. The Final Order was 
issued September 10, 1991 and Maverik filed its 
Request for Review October 11, 1991. Whether URCP 
6(e) is applicable or whether the crucial date is the 
mailing date are questions that involve the agency's 
application or interpretation of general law which we 
review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of 
error. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 
581, 587-89 (Utah 1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n, 
850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah App.1993). See also 
SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Utah 
1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
1. Date of Filing 
[6] UAPA provides a request for review must be filed 
"within 30 days after the issuance of the order...." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1989). The request 
must also "be sent by mail to the presiding officer and 
to each party." Id. § 63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv). The parties 
agree the order was dated and issued September 10, 
1991. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868, 
870 (Utah 1992) (holding administrative order is 
issued on date on face of order). 
Maverik first argues that Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 6(e) gives it a three day extension on the 
thirty day filing deadline. That rule provides: 
"Whenever a party ... is required to do some act ... 
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within a prescribed period after the service of a notice 
... upon him and the notice ... is served by mail, 3 days 
shall be added to the prescribed period." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 6(e) (emphasis added). That rule must be 
read in light of section 63-46b-12(l)(a) of UAPA 
which requires a party to appeal thirty days after the 
issuance of the administrative ruling. Thus, Rule 6(e) 
does not apply because under section 63-46b-12(l)(a) 
of UAPA the time for appeal runs from the issuance of 
an order not from the service of an order on a party. 
2. Filing Requirement 
[7] Maverik next argues Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
5 (FN7) somehow supports its contention the date of 
mailing is the relevant date. Rule 5(d) explicitly 
recognizes a distinction between the filing of 
documents and the service of documents on a party. 
See Utah R.Civ.P. 5(d). (FN8) All the language *950 
of Rule 5 relied on by Maverik relates to service on a 
party not to the filing of documents necessary to start 
an appeal and is, thus, inapposite. Likewise, Maverik's 
attempted reliance on the language of section 
63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv) is unpersuasive. The requirement 
that requests for review be sent to the presiding officer 
and the opposing party is a requirement of service, not 
of filing. 
Further, it is clear that under the procedural rules 
which govern our courts, filing requires actual delivery 
to the court. For example, in Silva v. Department of 
Employment Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1990) (per 
curiam), we dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a claim 
of a petitioner whose petition for review to this court 
arrived one day late in the mail. The petition had been 
mailed two days prior to the day the petition was due. 
We noted: "The argument that an appeal is filed when 
mailed has been consistently rejected in the past and 
we reject it here." Id. at 247 (citing Isaacson v. 
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983); State v. Palmer, 
111 P.2d 521 (Utah App. 1989)). In Isaacson, the 
supreme court noted that interpreting filing as mailing 
could lead to chaos in appellate procedure. Isaacson, 
669P.2dat851. 
Maverik provides no reason why we should interpret 
the term filing as used in UAPA inconsistently with 
how we interpret it under the procedural rules used in 
courts. Thus, absent a showing of good cause for an 
extension, the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12 
requires, as a prerequisite to the agency taking 
jurisdiction over a review, actual delivery of the 
necessary documents to the agency within the thirty 
day time limit. 
3. Extension of Filing Deadline 
Maverik next argues the Industrial Commission 
abused its discretion by failing to grant a one day 
extension of the filing deadline. Maverik does not 
identify the portion of 63-46b-16(4) under which it 
asks us to review this claim. See King v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 n. 6 (Utah App.1993) 
(encouraging counsel to clearly identify the portion of 
63-46b-16(4) under which review is sought). Because 
the authority to grant an extension in a filing deadline 
is not in an agency-specific statute, but rather a general 
provision of UAPA, and because Maverik is arguing an 
abuse of discretion standard, it appears Maverik is 
necessarily seeking review under Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1988). That catch-all portion of 
section 63-46b-16(4) provides we can grant relief if the 
agency action is "arbitrary or capricious." Id. We 
review agency action under this section for 
reasonableness. Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 1992). See also SEMECO v. 
Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) 
(Durham, J., dissenting). 
a. The Original Request for Reconsideration 
[8] For an agency to extend any deadline established 
under UAPA the petitioner must show good cause. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1988). In its Request 
for Reconsideration, Maverik made no attempt to show 
good cause. The Industrial Commission, in its Order 
denying the Request for Reconsideration, specifically 
notes Maverik's failure to show good cause. Thus, the 
Industrial Commission's decision denying Maverik a 
one day extension is not unreasonable in light of 
Maverik's complete failure to articulate any facts on 
which to base a good cause determination. 
b. The Second Request for Reconsideration 
[9] In a document captioned "Limited Request for 
Reconsideration" filed April 3, 1992, six days after the 
original Request for Reconsideration was denied and 
four days before the second appeal was filed, *951 
Maverik finally attempts to show good cause. There is 
no authorization for a "Limited Request for 
Reconsideration" in UAPA. Counsel's failure to 
comply with the rules which set forth the requirements 
for getting an extension of the filing deadline does not 
give him the right to create another layer of 
administrative appeal. (FN9) No section of UAPA 
provides a petitioner with the right to file more than 
one request for reconsideration. (FN 10) Endorsing 
such a procedure would allow mischievous counsel to 
use the right to reconsideration as a tool for needless, 
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and in some cases, harmful delay. Thus, this filing was 
appropriately disregarded by the Industrial 
Commission. (FN11) 
ATTORNEY FEES 
[10] Because we reject both appeals, we necessarily 
affirm the award of costs and attorney fees and the 
award of damages *952. authorized by the ALJ. The 
ALJ awarded legal costs of $1536.26 to McCord. She 
awarded $19,731 in legal fees to McCord. She also 
awarded $11,832.80 in back pay to McCord. (FN12) 
These awards are authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 
34-35-7.1(9) (1988). We also award McCord attorney 
fees on appeal under the same statute. Thus, we 
remand the case to the Industrial Commission for the 
sole purpose of assessing the appropriate amount of 
attorney fees for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Maverik brought the first appeal prior to exhausting 
the available administrative remedies. Maverik 
brought the second appeal from a reasonable ruling of 
the Industrial Commission that Maverik's Request for 
Review was untimely. Thus, we dismiss case number 
910413-CA and affirm the Order of the Industrial 
Commission in case number 920206-CA. We remand 
the case to the Industrial Commission for the sole 
purpose of assessing attorney fees on appeal. 
JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
(FN1.) This opinion replaces the earlier opinion in 
cases No. 920206-CA and No. 910413-CA, issued 
June 3, 1993, pursuant to cross-petitions for rehearing 
granted August 28, 1993. 
(FN2.) Because Appellant does not challenge the 
factual findings of the Industrial Commission, we 
recite the facts in accord with those findings. See 
King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 
(Utah App. 1993). 
(FN3.) In the Order denying the Request for Review, 
the Industrial Commission also addressed and 
rejected Maverik's claims on the merits. Because of 
our ultimate conclusion, we need not and do not 
comment on the propriety of the Industrial 
Commission's disposition on the merits. 
(FN4.) We note our concern that despite the inordinate 
amount of briefing and conflict in this case, no party 
to either of these appeals directed us to the 
determinative statute. 
(FN5.) Because we find the Anti-Discrimination Act 
required Maverik to petition for review by the 
Industrial Commission, we do not directly address, 
but merely acknowledge, some conflict between our 
decision and Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 
810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991). Although the 
Industrial Commission asks us to revisit that decision, 
we find it unnecessary at this time. In Heinecke, we 
focused on the language of Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-12(l)(a) (1989) and held a petitioner need not 
avail himself of a review permitted by agency rule 
prior to filing an appeal to this court. We 
distinguished such permissive review from review 
which is statutorily mandated. Id. at 462. See also 
Hi-Country Homeowners Assoc, v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989) (holding 
review pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b) 
must be exhausted prior to judicial appeal). 
In Heinecke, however, we did not address the impact 
of Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-14(2) (1989) which 
provides: "A party may seek judicial reviewcw/y 
after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available...." Id. See also Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 
782 P.2d 519, 524 n. 3 (Utah 1989) (citing section 
63-46b-14 for proposition petitioner must exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to judicial review). 
According to the Industrial Commission section 
63-46b-14(2) requires a party to utilize every 
possible agency review prior to filing an 
administrative appeal. We note Heinecke was 
rendered without the benefit of briefing by counsel. 
Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 462. Further, we specifically 
recognized we might revisit Heinecke at an 
appropriate point in the future. Id. at 464 n. 6. That 
day still awaits. 
(FN6.) Regardless of the premature nature of its 
appeal, Maverik asks us to apply Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(c) and find the appeal 
procedurally proper. Maverik fails to note, however, 
that Rule 4(c) does not apply to petitions for review 
of administrative actions. See Utah R.App.P. 18. 
(FN7.) Rule 5 relates to the service and filing of 
papers. See Utah R.Civ.P. 5. 
(FN8.) That section provides: 
All papers after the complaint required to be served 
upon a party shall btfiled with the court either before 
service or within a reasonable time thereafter, but the 
court may upon motion of a party or on its own 
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, 
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requests for documents, requests for admissions and 
answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on 
order of the court or for use in the proceeding. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 5(d) (emphasis added). 
*952_ (FN9.) As our supreme court has noted in a 
different setting, if we allow a second motion for 
reconsideration or "re-reconsideration" what is to 
prevent another motion for re-re-reconsideration? " 
Tenacious litigants and lawyers might persist in 
motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically 
[this could go on] ad infinitum' " Watkiss & 
Campbell v. FOA & Sons, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 
(Utah 1991) (quoting Drury v. Lanceford, 18 Utah 2d 
74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966)) (alteration added). 
(FN 10.) Likewise, under the administrative law 
scheme in place prior to UAPA we noted that a 
petitioner could not file successive motions for 
review. See Ring v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 P.2d 
602, 603 (Utah App. 1987) (per curiam). Under that 
scheme filing material which purports to supplement 
an already denied motion did not revive the motion. 
Id. As we explicitly noted in Ring, a petitioner is 
only "entitled to 'one bite of the apple' on review 
before the Industrial Commission." Id. at 604. 
Under UAPA, the same reasoning applies to requests 
for reconsideration, a petitioner has only one 
opportunity to apply for reconsideration. See also 
Utility Trailer Sales of Salt Lake, Inc. v. Fake, 740 
P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987) (recognizing rule 
against repetitive adjudications in arbitration setting); 
Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d 1200, 1202 
(Utah 1984) (recognizing rule against repetitive 
challenges to Industrial Commission determinations 
of spousal dependency); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989) 
(recognizing rule against successive post-judgment 
motions). 
(FN11.) Even if we were to treat the second Request 
for Reconsideration as procedurally proper, we would 
dismiss the second appeal. The request would 
reinvoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission. Under UAPA, because the Industrial 
Commission did not respond to the request it would 
be deemed denied April 23, 1992 by operation of 
law. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989); 
Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568, 572 
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1992). Therefore no "final agency action" for this 
court to review existed until after April 23, 1992. 
UAPA provides: 
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued 
for which review by the agency or by a superior 
agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if 
the order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration with the agency.... Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-13(l)(a) (1989) (emphasis added). 
This section provides a petitioner with the option of 
applying to the agency for reconsideration or 
appealing to the courts. It does not provide a 
petitioner the opportunity to pursue both routes 
concurrently. The emphasized language indicates a 
petitioner who decides to file a request for 
reconsideration no longer has a "final agency action" 
from which to appeal. The petitioner must wait until 
the request is either responded to in writing or denied 
by operation of law. Section 63-46b-13(l)(a) 
provides a request for reconsideration is not a 
mandatory step in exhausting administrative remedies 
or reaching "finality" to give the courts jurisdiction 
over an appeal. Under UAPA, a request for 
reconsideration asks the highest level of 
administrative decision maker to reassess a claim 
they have previously examined. A request for 
review, on the other hand, asks a higher level 
decision maker to evaluate the claim. Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989) (agency review 
procedures)with id. § 63-46b-13 (requests for 
reconsideration). Petitioners who choose to take 
advantage of the statutory provision that allows them 
to request reconsideration must thereafter accept the 
consequences, one of which is that an appeal to the 
judicial system cannot be made until the agency acts 
on the request. 
Thus, the second request for reconsideration would 
have given the Industrial Commission another 
opportunity to address the merits. Therefore, as of 
April 7, 1992, Maverik would have no final order 
from which to appeal. Under this analysis, the 
second appeal would be brought from a non-final 
order over which we have no jurisdiction and we 
would dismiss it. 
Further, the window for Maverik to file an appeal 
from the Industrial Commission's denial of the second 
request would have been from April 23, 1992 to May 
23, 1992. Thus, regardless of the analysis we apply, 
Maverik is left without judicial review of the merits. 
*952_ (FN 12.) Counsel for Maverik has consistently 
complained no actual damages amount was set in the 
ALJ's order. He apparently is unwilling to do the 
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math using the formula established in the ALJ's 
original order. To eliminate any confusion and 
reduce future conflict in this unnecessarily 
contentious litigation, we set forth the back pay 
calculation using the formula established in the ALJ's 
original order. 
Oct 15, 1988 to March 31, 1990 
$3.35 per hr for 24 hrs a week 
$80.40 per week for 76 weeks 
6,110.40 
April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991 
$3.80 per hr for 24 hrs a week 
$91.20 per week for 52 weeks 
4,742.40 
April 1, 1991 to June 26, 1991 
$4.25 per hr for 24 hrs a week 
$102.00 per week for 12.5 weeks 
1,275.00 
Subtotal 12,127.80 
Minus earnings at Ashley Elementary 
295.00 
Back Pay award equals 
$11,832.80 
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*1284 803 P.2d 1284 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Kenneth L. VIRGIN, Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Stateline Chevron, Workers* Compensation Fund, 
and 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Respondents. 
No. 900167-CA. 
Dec. 18, 1990. 
Claimant sought review of Industrial Commission's 
order denying his claim for workers' compensation 
benefits for hip replacement surgery. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held that substantial evidence 
supported finding that claimant's disability and surgery 
were caused solely by preexisting hip disease. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, J., concurred in the result. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure <®=>791 
15A—-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak784 Fact Questions 
15Ak791 Substantial Evidence. 
[See headnote text below] 
[ 1 ] Workers' Compensation <S=> 1939.4(4) 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, 
Commission, Board, Officer, or 
Arbitrator 
413kl939.4 Sufficiency of Evidence in Support 
413kl939.4(4) Substantial Evidence. 
Standard of review of Industrial Commission's 
decision on workers' compensation claim is whether 
findings are supported by substantial evidence on 
record as whole. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l to 63-46b-22. 
[2] Workers' Compensation <@^=>552 
413 — 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously Impaired 
Condition 
413k552 In General. 
Industrial injuries that aggravate or "light up" 
preexisting conditions and are causally connected to 
subsequent onset of symptoms of disease or condition 
are compensable if subsequent disability is medical 
result of exertion or injury that occurred during work-
related activity and is not solely result of preexisting 
condition. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69; U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-69 (Repealed). 
[3] Workers' Compensation <@=>552 
413 — 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously Impaired 
Condition 
413k552 In General. 
Ratable permanent aggravation of preexisting 
condition, rather than temporary aggravation or 
nonratable acceleration of symptoms, must be present 
to justify award of workers' compensation benefits if 
industrial injury results in permanent impairment that 
aggravates preexisting permanent impairment to any 
degree. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69; U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69 
(Repealed). 
[4] Workers' Compensation <®=>1542 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and Consequences 
Thereof 
413kl542 Aggravation or Acceleration of Disease 
or Impaired Condition in General. 
Substantial evidence supported finding by Industrial 
Commission that claimant's entire ratable impairment 
from avascular necrosis of hip that required hip 
replacement surgery preexisted industrial accident in 
which auto body struck claimant's hip and that accident 
did not contribute to the claimant's impairment and, 
thus, that claimant was not entitled to disability 
benefits; claimant's doctor testified that preexisting 
disease was sole cause of claimant's disability and 
subsequent hip replacement surgery and that while 
perhaps surgery had happened sooner than it would 
have without industrial accident, ultimately surgery 
would have been necessary. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69; 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69 (Repealed). 
*1285 LeRoy K. Johnson (argued), Salt Lake City, 
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I 
for petitioner. 
Richard Sumsion, Mark Dean (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for Workers' Comp. Fund of Utah. 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
James E. Harward, Director, Salt Lake City, for Div. 
of Legal Affairs, Industrial Com'n of Utah. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Kenneth L. Virgin ("Virgin") seeks review of the 
Industrial Commission's ("Commission") order denying 
his claim for workers' compensation benefits. The 
Commission concluded there was not a causal 
connection between Virgin's industrial injury and his 
subsequent hip replacement surgery and thus denied 
disability benefits. We affirm. 
On June 15, 1986, Virgin was injured on the job 
when an automobile engine on which he was working, 
snapped a supporting chain and hit Virgin in the area of 
his left hip and knocked him down. Virgin did not 
seek medical attention until three days later when he 
was examined by a physician's assistant who found 
bruising and tenderness in the left hip area, but no 
fractures. Virgin reported the industrial accident 
immediately, but made no claim for compensation at 
that time and did not miss any work as a result of this 
industrial accident. 
Virgin claimed to have trouble with his left hip two to 
three months after the accident. Virgin did not seek 
further medical treatment, however, until nearly 
fourteen months after the industrial accident, when he 
was seen in the emergency room of a local hospital. 
Virgin was then referred to an orthopedic surgeon who 
examined him in September 1987. The orthopedic 
surgeon concluded Virgin had severe aseptic necrosis 
of the left hip and aseptic necrosis to a lesser degree of 
the right hip "probably on the basis of alcoholism," and 
recommended a total hip replacement when symptoms 
warranted, but suggested Virgin wait as long as 
possible. 
*1286 In February 1988, Virgin was examined by 
another orthopedic surgeon. Virgin had a left total hip 
replacement on May 25, 1988 and returned to work on 
June 15, 1988. He claimed he was entitled to medical 
expenses, temporary total disability and permanent 
partial disability as a result of his surgery, claiming his 
hip replacement surgery was caused in part by his 1986 
industrial accident. Virgin requested a hearing to 
review his entitlement to compensation. After the 
initial hearing, the administrative law judge ("A.L.J.") 
appointed a medical panel consisting of one orthopedic 
surgeon, Dr. Craig McQueen. Dr. McQueen examined 
Virgin and thereafter prepared and submitted the 
following medical findings. 
[T]he patient did suffer an injury to his hip during the 
June 15, 1986 accident which aggravated his pre-
existing avascular necrosis. So I do not feel that his 
May 25, 1988 surgery was necessitated by the 
industrial accident. I think perhaps it happened 
sooner than it would have had he not had an injury, 
but I feel he would have ultimately had needed 
surgery on this inspite of any industrial injury.... I do 
not feel that the disability following his surgery was 
due to the industrial accident Since I do not feel 
that he had an industrial injury that caused his hip 
problems, I do not think he had any permanent 
physical impairment directly caused by the industrial 
accident. The percentage of permanent physical 
impairment directly attributable to the pre-existing 
conditions would be approximately a 40% permanent 
partial impairment of the left hip. He would have the 
same on the right hip, but these would be pre-
existing. I do agree that the industrial accident... did 
aggravate his pre-existing condition, but was not 
causally related to his avascular necrosis. 
At a subsequent hearing, both parties examined Dr. 
McQueen in an attempt to clarify whether Virgin's 
earlier industrial accident was causally related to his 
hip replacement surgery. Dr. McQueen maintained his 
position that all of Virgin's ratable impairment was 
caused by his pre-existing avascular necrosis. He did 
testify that the industrial injury may have necessitated 
surgery sooner, but he was unable to speculate as to 
how much sooner. At the hearing, the A.L.J, 
questioned Dr. McQueen about the 40% permanent 
partial impairment he had assigned to Virgin. The 
A.L.J, asked whether it could be "reasonable to reach 
the conclusion that of that 40%, 5% was caused by the 
industrial contribution?" Dr. McQueen responded that 
this "might be reasonable, because that's a small 
amount of what his total disability is, because certainly, 
in my initial opinion, the whole major cause for his 
problem is the avascular necrosis and I think there is no 
question about that. I think there is a small 
contribution from his industrial injury." In answer to a 
subsequent question however, Dr. McQueen reiterated 
his opinion that all of Virgin's ratable impairment was 
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due to the pre-existing avascular necrosis. 
Based on the testimony of the medical panel, the 
A.L.J, found the industrial accident directly and 
permanently aggravated Virgin's pre-existing avascular 
necrosis and thus had a causal relationship to his hip 
replacement, and awarded Virgin medical expenses 
associated with the hip replacement and temporary 
total and permanent partial workers' compensation 
benefits. 
The Commission reviewed the case, concluded 
Virgin was not entitled to benefits and revoked the 
A.L.J.'s order and findings. The Commission found: 
The Medical Panel report dated January 29, 1989, 
stated that while the industrial accident may have 
aggravated Applicant's pre-existing asymptomatic 
avascular necrosis, it was not causally related. It 
further stated that no permanent physical impairment 
was directly caused by the industrial accident and that 
the period of disability following the surgery was not 
due to the industrial accident.... 
Because the Commission finds that no industrial 
benefits are due on account of *1287 Applicant's 
injury, the Commission hereby adopts the report of 
the Medical Panel that Applicant's entire ratable 
impairment pre-existed the industrial accident of June 
15, 1986, and that the accident did not contribute to 
Applicant's impairment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] At the outset, it is important to note that the 
Commission, not the A.L.J., is the ultimate finder of 
fact. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d 
807, 811 (Utah 1980); see Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-12(6)(c) (1989). Medical causation, including 
whether an industrial accident aggravated a pre-
existing condition, is a factual matter. (FN1) 
Proceedings in this case were commenced after January 
1, 1988, thus the Utah Administrative Procedure Act 
("UAPA") controls. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 
-22 (1989). This court clearly articulated the standard 
for reviewing factual findings under the UAPA in 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct.App.1989). "[I]t is clear that the Board's 
findings of fact will be affirmed only if they are 
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court.'" Id. at 67. 
"Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.' " Id. 
The party challenging the Commission's findings of 
fact "must marshall all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and 
in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
Id. at 68. In Grace Drilling, this court also noted that 
in applying the substantial evidence test when 
reviewing findings of fact, the court should not 
substitute its own judgment as between two reasonably 
conflicting views, even though it may have come to a 
different conclusion. "It is the province of the Board, 
not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, 
and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from 
the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the 
inferences." Id. 
MEDICAL CAUSATION 
The Commission concedes that Virgin suffered an 
industrial accident when he was struck by the swinging 
engine while at work. Thus, legal causation is not at 
issue. (FN2) Rather, this case centers on whether 
Virgin's industrial accident was the medical cause of 
his hip replacement surgery and subsequent disability. 
(FN3) 
Virgin argues that because the medical panel stated 
his 1986 industrial injury aggravated his pre-existing 
avascular necrosis and may have necessitated surgery 
sooner, his hip replacement should be compensable, 
regardless of the fact that the doctor was unable to 
clearly assign any degree of permanent or temporary 
impairment to his 1986 industrial accident. The 
Commission contends there was no medical *1288 
causation because the "aggravating" industrial injury 
did not result in a medically measurable permanent 
impairment. The Commission claims there can be no 
liability where as a result of an industrial accident, a 
worker suffers only temporary aggravation or pain or a 
nonratable, speculative acceleration of symptoms of a 
pre-existing condition. 
Virgin has the burden to prove a causal connection 
between his 1986 industrial injury and his subsequent 
hip surgery and disability by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 
1092, 1095 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Large v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct.App.1988) 
(citing Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986)). If Virgin cannot demonstrate this link, he 
cannot recover. Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. 
[2] Generally, industrial injuries that aggravate or 
"light up" pre-existing conditions and are causally 
connected to the subsequent onset of symptoms of the 
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disease or condition, are compensable. Id. at 25 (citing 
Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 
427 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah 1967)). However, a claimant 
must prove the subsequent disability is "medically the 
result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a 
work-related activity," id. at 27, and not solely the 
result of a pre-existing condition. (FN4) 
Recently, this court addressed a similar pre-existing 
condition-medical causation issue in Zimmerman v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
. In Zimmerman, the applicant claimed an industrial 
injury to his back aggravated his previously 
asymptomatic Reiter's syndrome and spinal stenosis, 
and thus he should have been granted benefits for the 
pre-existing disease under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69, 
(FN5) much as Virgin claims in this case. The medical 
panel in *1289 Zimmerman stated: "The industrial 
injury aggravated the pre-existing condition since we 
are unable to find any evidence of pain before the 
industrial injury." Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 1129 
(emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, the medical panel concluded that all of 
Zimmerman's residual back problems were caused by 
his pre-existing conditions. Based upon the medical 
evidence in Zimmerman, this court acknowledged that 
compensation must be awarded "if the industrial injury 
results in a permanent impairment that is aggravated by 
or aggravates a pre-existing permanent impairment to 
any degree." Id. at 1131 (quoting Second Injury Fund 
v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Utah 
1985)). However, we denied recovery in Zimmerman 
because we found the medical panel report as a whole 
indicated the "aggravation" referred to was due solely 
to temporary pain. We stated: "No permanent 
impairment was found to have resulted from the 
industrial injury itself or in combination with the prior 
existing conditions. Because the industrial accident did 
not result in a permanent impairment, the Board 
correctly denied benefits." Id. 
[3] Virgin relies heavily on the "aggravation to any 
degree" language in Zimmerman to support his claim 
for benefits. However, this language does not refer to 
temporary aggravation or nonratable acceleration of 
symptoms, but to a ratable permanent aggravation of a 
pre-existing condition. (FN6) 
[4] In this case, the medical panel report indicated 
that while the industrial injury "aggravated his pre-
existing avascular necrosis," Virgin's left hip surgery 
and subsequent temporary and 40% permanent 
disability were not caused by the industrial injury. In 
its report, the medical panel speculated that perhaps 
the surgery happened sooner than it would have 
without the industrial accident, but could not quantify 
the time. The panel also speculated as a result of the 
A.L.J.'s questions, that it "might be reasonable" to 
assign 5% of Virgin's disability to his industrial 
accident, but later the panel clearly rejected any 
allocation to the industrial accident. The medical panel 
stated that ultimately, Virgin would have needed the 
surgery in any event. 
Although Dr. McQueen's testimony is confusing at 
times, ultimately, the doctor firmly states that the sole 
cause of Virgin's disability and consequent surgery was 
his pre-existing avascular necrosis. 
The Commission entered specific findings regarding 
medical causation stating that, "[B]ecause the 
Commission finds that no industrial benefits are due on 
account of Applicant's injury, the Commission hereby 
adopts the report of the Medical Panel that Applicant's 
entire ratable impairment pre-existed the industrial 
accident of June 15, 1986, and that the accident did not 
contribute to Applicant's impairment." 
As we have previously recognized, the Commission 
is the ultimate fact finder in workers' compensation 
cases. As the fact finder, the Commission may choose 
to give certain evidence more weight than other 
evidence. See Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah 
2d 235, 398 P.2d 882 (1965). In Mollerup, the court 
noted that "[i]t was both the duty and the prerogative of 
the Commission to view [the doctor's] entire testimony 
together and it could believe those statements which 
impressed it as being true, even though there may have 
been some seeming contradictions in other parts of his 
testimony." 398 P.2d at 885 (citations omitted). 
More recently, this court has held that the 
Commission will not be reversed simply *1290. 
because it has chosen to rely on one portion of a 
medical panel report and to reject other inconsistent 
portions. See USX Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
781 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
We conclude there is substantial evidence in the 
medical panel report to support the Commission's 
finding that "the applicant's entire ratable impairment 
pre-existed the industrial accident of June 15, 1986, 
and that the accident did not contribute to the 
applicant's impairment." Therefore, we affirm the 
Commission's order denying Virgin benefits. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs. 
BENCH, J., concurs in the result. 
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(FN1.) See, e.g., Anderson v. Dominic Elec., 660 P.2d 
241, 242 (Utah 1983) (whether industrial accident 
aggravated pre-existing injury is factual matter best 
left to Commission); Frenchik v. Industrial Comm'n, 
22 Utah 2d 123, 449 P.2d 649, 650 (1969) 
(Commission's factual findings that medical panel 
unable to relate present difficulty to industrial injury 
conclusive); Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 
954, 957 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (factual finding that 
industrial injury was not medical cause of claimant's 
permanent disability upheld). 
(FN2.) In Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
claimant must prove both "legal" and "medical" 
causation in order to recover workers' compensation 
benefits. "Under the legal test, the law must define 
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of 'arising out 
of the employment' ... [then] the doctors must say 
whether the exertion (having been held legally 
sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this 
[injury]." Id. at 25 (quoting Larson,Workmen's 
Compensation § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to 277). 
(FN3.) In this case, it is important to note that Virgin 
did not claim any temporary disability immediately 
following the accident, but instead made claims only 
for the temporary and permanent disability associated 
with the hip replacement. 
(FN4.) Utah's appellate courts have denied benefits in 
each of the following cases as the court found the 
disability was solely the result of a pre-existing 
condition. In Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
Commission's denial of benefits for aggravation of a 
pre-existing condition where the medical evidence 
was conflicting and inconclusive. The court in 
Lancaster noted that "although the medical evidence 
was conflicting, it is the responsibility of the 
administrative law judge to resolve factual conflicts." 
Id. at 241. In Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 116 P.2d 
937, 939 (Utah Ct.App.1989) affd, 797 P.2d 1098 
(Utah 1990), this court upheld denial of benefits 
where the Commission discounted opinions of 
claimant's experts and adopted the opinion of the 
medical panel that disability was due entirely to a 
pre-existing condition. In Large v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct.App.1988), this 
court upheld the Commission's denial of benefits 
where there was "substantial evidence in the record to 
support a finding that the 1985 injury was not the 
medical cause of [claimant's] permanent total 
disability," as claimant's disability resulted from pre-
existing conditions. Id. at 957. 
(FN5.) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69(1) (1986), as in 
effect at the time the events in this case occurred, 
generally provides for apportionment of liability for 
disability benefits where an industrial accident 
aggravates a pre-existing disease. The statute sets out 
a procedure for apportionment of compensation 
between the employer or its insurance carrier and the 
Second Injury Fund. The statute specifically 
provides: 
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by incidental injury, disease, or 
congenital causes, sustained an industrial injury for 
which either compensation or medical care, or both, 
is provided by this chapter that results in permanent 
incapacity which is substantially greater than he 
would have incurred if he had not had the pre-
existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is 
aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, as 
outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the 
basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the 
employer for such compensation, medical care, and 
other related items shall be for the industrial injury 
only. The remainder shall be paid out of the Second 
Injury Fund.... 
In 1988, section 35-1-69 was repealed and a new 
section 35-1-69 was reenacted. Under the current 
version, the test for apportioning liability for 
compensation requires at least a ten percent pre-
existing whole person permanent impairment with 
additional impairment caused by accident from 
employment resulting in permanent total disability 
before liability for compensation is apportioned. 
This court has noted that the statute itself does not 
entitle anyone to benefits for aggravation of a pre-
existing injury. "Entitlement to benefits is a 
prerequisite to consideration of apportionment. 
Where the disability is the result of pre-existing 
conditions and not an industrial accident, a claimant 
is not entitled to disability benefits." Large, 758 P.2d 
at 957. 
*1290_ (FN6.) When the medical panel cannot assign 
a measurable percentage of responsibility to the 
industrial injury, it would seem absurd to conclude 
that the Second Injury Fund must assume complete 
responsibility for a disability caused solely by a pre-
existing condition. The purpose of section 35-1-69 is 
to apportion liability only where an industrial injury 
measurably contributes to a permanent disability 
caused in part by a pre-existing condition, not to 
simply impose liability on the Second Injury Fund 
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(now Employer's Reinsurance Fund) anytime a 
worker's disability is caused by a pre-existing 
condition. 
. ' ' ' i 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Edward ESQUIVEL, deceased; Norma Esquivel; 
Richard 
Esquivel; Angel Esquivel; Edica Esquivel; and 
Ofelia Herrera, Petitioners, 
v. 
LABOR COMMISSION, Redd Roofing & 
Construction Co., and CNA 
Co., Respondents. 
No.981084-CA. 
Jan. 22, 1999. 
Deceased worker's dependents appealed Labor 
Commission Appeals Board determination that 
workers' compensation carrier was entitled to offset 
against its future obligations to dependents of full net 
amount of dependents' third-party recovery from 
equipment manufacturer. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, Associate P.J., held that: (1) Board's 
method of determining offset comported with statutory 
scheme, and (2) dependents waived issue of use of 




[ 1 ] Workers' Compensation <S=> 1939.1 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, 
Commission, Board, Officer, or 
Arbitrator 
413kl939.1 In General; Questions of Law or 
Fact. 
Court of Appeals will affirm Labor Commission 
Appeal Board's application of the law so long as it is 
reasonable. U.C.A.1953, 34A-1-301. 
[2] Workers' Compensation <S==>2247 
413 — 
413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or 
Common-Law Rights of Action and 
Defenses 
413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General 
for Employee's Injury or Death 
413XX(C)6 Amount and Items of Recovery 
413k2244 Action by or on Behalf of Employer or 
Insurer 
413k2247 Expenses of Investigation and 
Litigation (Attorney's Fees). 
Deduction, from dependents' recovery against third-
party equipment manufacturer for death of worker, of 
attorney fees and costs chargeable to workers' 
compensation carrier, followed by reduction of carrier's 
future obligation to dependents by full amount of net 
recovery, comported with statutory scheme for 
disbursement of proceeds of third-party tort actions. 
U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-106(5)(a-c). 
[3] Workers' Compensation <©=> 1856 
413—-
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)5 Presentation and Reservation Below 
of Grounds of Review 
413kl 845 Necessity 
413kl 856 Award or Judgment. 
[See headnote text below] 
[3] Workers' Compensation <®=^  1907 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)10 Assignments of Error and Briefs 
413kl907 Briefs. 
Deceased worker's dependents waived issue of 
whether workers' compensation carrier could use 
discounting to calculate present value of future 
payment obligation to dependents, by failing to directly 
address issue either before Labor Commission Appeals 
Board or in brief on appeal. 
Robert B. Sykes and Ron J. Kramer, Salt Lake City, 
for Petitioners. 
Theodore E. Kannell and Stephen P. Horvat, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondents Redd Roofing & 
Construction Co. and CNA Company. 
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Labor Commission. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, BENCH and 
GARFF. (FN1) 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
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U 1 The dependents of Edward Esquivel petition this 
court for review of an order of *441 the Utah Labor 
Commission's Appeals Board (the Board), holding that 
respondents Redd Roofing & Construction Co. (Redd 
Roofing) and CNA Insurance Co. (CNA) were entitled 
to an offset against their future workers' compensation 
payment obligation to the dependents because the 
dependents had obtained a third-party tort judgment for 
the death of Esquivel. We affirm the Board's order. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 On April 26, 1993, Esquivel was fatally injured 
when he fell through a warehouse roof at the Freeport 
Center in Clearfield, Utah, while working as a roofer 
for Redd Roofing. At the time of the accident, 
Esquivel was sweeping gravel from the roof with a 
Gravely International (Gravely) brand sweeping 
machine. 
K 3 Redd Roofing's workers' compensation insurance 
carrier, CNA, began paying the statutorily required 
workers' compensation benefits to the dependents in 
1993. In March 1994, the dependents settled a 
negligence lawsuit against the Freeport Center, the 
owner of the building where the accident occurred, and 
received $375,000. The dependents and CNA entered 
into an agreement, approved by the Utah Labor 
Commission (Commission), requiring CNA to pay 
$205 per week for as long as the dependents were 
entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
H 4 The dependents filed a product liability suit in 
federal court against Gravely, the manufacturer of the 
sweeping machine Esquivel was using at the time of 
the industrial accident. The dependents obtained a 
judgment in the amount of $203,507.25. Upon 
learning of this judgment, CNA discontinued its 
weekly payments to the dependents. CNA asserted that 
because the dependents had received third-party tort 
compensation, it was no longer required, under Utah's 
third-party tort compensation statute, to continue 
making workers' compensation payments. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) (1997). (FN2) 
H 5 On July 10, 1996, the dependents filed an 
Application for Hearing before the Commission, 
contending that CNA had wrongfully discontinued 
workers' compensation payments. CNA countered that 
it was entitled to an offset against future payments 
because of the third-party tort recovery. CNA waived 
any right to reimbursement for payments already made. 
After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ), the ALJ ordered CNA to resume weekly 
compensation payments to the dependents. 
K 6 In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order, the ALJ found that attorney fees in the 
Gravely suit were $81,402.90 and costs were 
$53,596.38, for a total case "expense" of $134,999.28. 
After deducting this expense from the $203,507.25 
judgment, a net recovery of $68,507.97 remained. The 
ALJ found that because CNA's future obligation 
exceeded the net judgment, it was responsible for 
100% of the attorney fees and costs. The ALJ also 
determined that CNA's lien amount must be reduced by 
those fees and costs, thus eliminating that lien. Finally, 
the ALJ held that the dependents could retain the entire 
net judgment of $68,507.97, and that no amount would 
be credited against future payments owed by CNA. ^ 
K 7 CNA and Redd Roofing filed a Motion for 
Review with the Board, claiming the ALJ had 
mistakenly subtracted fees and costs twice, effectively 
denying CNA its offset. In its Order Granting Motion 
for Review, the Board reversed the ALJ and 
determined CNA was entitled to an offset of the 
$68,507.97 net judgment against its future obligations. 
K 8 Relying on Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-1 
-4, (FN3) the Board also ruled that *442 CNA could 
"determine the extent of its offset by using an 8% 
discount rate to comput[e] the present value of its 
future liability," and determined that "[t]he present 
value of Redd Roofing's liability for future dependents' 
benefits, to be offset by the [Gravely suit] award [of 
$68,507.97], is $83,000." 
U 9 The dependents filed a Petition for Review with 
this court. 
ISSUES 
TJ 10 Two issues must be resolved on appeal: First, 
whether the Board erroneously held that CNA was 
entitled to offset the full balance of the net proceeds 
from the third-party tort recovery against its future 
compensation liability to the dependants; and second, 
whether the Board erroneously peirmitted CNA to apply 
Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-1-4 and discount 
its future obligation for workers' compensation benefits 
by eight percent to arrive at a present value. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] U 11 We will not disturb an agency's ruling unless 
petitioners can establish they have been "substantially 
prejudiced" by the agency's erroneous interpretation or 
application of the law. See Utah Code Ann. § 
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63-46b-16(4)(d) (1997 & Supp.1998). In addition, the 
Legislature has granted the Commission broad 
discretion to determine the facts and apply the law. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997) ("The 
commission has the duty and the full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and 
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or 
chapter it administers."). We have previously held that 
the statute's "grant of discretion to the Commission to 
apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate 
standard of review to its determinations." Osman 
Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P.2d 
240, 243 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Caporoz v. Labor 
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). 
Thus, we will affirm the Board's application of the law 
so long as it is reasonable. See Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 
143. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Entitlement to Offset 
[2] Tf 12 The dependents contend that the Board 
improperly determined that Redd Roofing and CNA 
have a "priority first right of reimbursement" in the 
third-party tort recovery that "takes precedence over 
the claimant's interest." CNA argues the Board 
properly applied the governing statute. 
K 13 Distribution of proceeds of a third-party tort 
action under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act is 
addressed in section 34A-2-106(5), which states: 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, 
it shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections 
(5)(a) through (c). 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their interests 
may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or 
carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the 
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the 
dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments 
shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of 
costs and attorneys' fees ... for [workers' 
compensation] payments made as follows: 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured 
employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death, 
to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any 
obligation thereafter accruing against the person 
liable for compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5). 
Tf 14 In the dependents' lawsuit against Gravely, the 
jury returned a judgment in favor of the dependents in 
the amount of $814,029. However, the jury found 
Gravely only 25% at fault. The jury apportioned 25% 
*443 of the fault to Esquivel and 50% to Redd 
Roofing. (FN4) Thus, the dependents were awarded a 
gross judgment of only 25% of the total damages; that 
is, they were awarded damages of $203,507.25. 
U 15 The ALJ determined that attorney costs and fees 
totaled $134,999.28. After these fees and costs were 
deducted, the dependents' net award, or "balance" 
remaining, from the Gravely suit was $68,507.97. In 
apportioning the attorney fees between the dependents 
and Redd Roofing, the Board recognized that section 
34A-2-106(5)(a) requires that fees and costs must be 
allocated between the parties "as their interests may 
appear." The Board stated that in determining the 
parties' interests, "it [was] important to note" that 
section 34A-2-106(5)(b) and (c) "grant the first right of 
reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier." 
Thus, the Board reasoned, Redd Roofing's share of 
attorney fees and costs necessarily had to be 
determined first. Only thereafter could the dependents' 
share be determined, and, the Board held, would "then 
be limited to the amount of the award that remains after 
Redd Roofing's share has been deducted." The 
Board's order accordingly apportioned the parties' 
shares of attorney fees and costs as follows: 
In this case, the amount of the third party judgment 
actually available for allocation is $68,507.97, which 
represents the amount of the third party judgment 
after attorney fees and costs have been deducted. 
The present value of Redd Roofing's liability for 
future dependents' benefits, to be offset by the third 
party award, is $83,000. Because Redd Roofing's 
interest in the award is more than the net amount of 
the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire 
interest in the award. Consequently, all attorneys fees 
and costs must be allocated to Redd Roofing. 
K 16 The Board then concluded that because the 
statute required that the "balance" be "applied to 
reduce" the insurer's future obligation, CNA was 
entitled to "use the third party award to offset its 
obligation to make weekly payments to the dependents 
until such time as the award has been exhausted." 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
973 P.2d 440, Esquivel v. Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 1999) Page 4 
( 
K 17 The dependents contend the Board's order failed 
to properly allocate costs and fees to Redd Roofing/ 
CNA. The dependents argue that because the entire 
$68,507.97 net judgment was offset against future 
workers' compensation benefits, the order is 
"manifestly unjust and contrary to the letter and spirit 
of [section] 106(5)." (FN5) 
U 18 According to the dependents' interpretation of 
section 34A2-106(5), the statute requires a "three-step 
sequence for disbursement." First, the attorney fees 
and costs are to be paid, see Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-106(5)(a) (1997), with the responsibility for this 
amount apportioned among the parties "as their 
interests may appear." The injured person receives 
"credit" against their share *444 of attorney fees and 
costs for the amount apportionable to the employer/ 
issuer. See id. Second, the insurer is to be reimbursed 
for amounts already paid to the injured party. See id. 
§ 34A-2-106(5)(b). Third, the dependents assert, the 
insurer is to receive an "offset" against future benefits 
only after deducting the employee's "credit" for 
attorney fees and costs already paid by the carrier. 
This analysis requires that attorney fees and costs be 
deducted a second time from the "net judgment"~that 
is, from the amount remaining after attorney fees and 
costs have been deducted to arrive at the amount that 
should be "offset" against future workers' 
compensation payments. We do not agree with the 
dependents' description of this last step. 
K 19 "Because we assume that the legislature used 
each term in the statute advisedly, we read the statute's 
words literally 'unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable.' " Olsen v. Mclntyre Inv. Co., 
956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). Our 
supreme court has stated: 
The basic purpose of [the third party recovery] 
statute is that of making an equitable arrangement 
between an injured employee, and an insurer (or 
employer) who pays him workmen's compensation, 
with respect to a cause of action against a third party 
who injures the employee. It preserves the action to 
the employee, but it prevents him from having double 
recovery by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. It 
also gives the insurer the right to bring the action, but 
allows it only to reimburse itself and then pay any 
balance to the employee. 
Worthen v. Shurtleff& Andrews, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 
426 P.2d 223, 225 (1967). Consistent with this 
reasoning, the Board determined that subsections (b) 
and (c) of section 34A-2-106(5) require that any 
balance, after attorney fees and costs have been 
deducted, must either be used to compensate the 
insurer for payments already made, or be applied as an 
offset against future obligations. Because the 
$68,507.97 amounted to less than the total future 
benefits owed by CNA to the dependents, it merely 
"reduced" any future obligation by that amount. The 
Board determined that "[a]fter the amount of 
$68,507.97 has been [paid to the dependents and] fully 
offset against such future benefits, Redd Roofing must 
then resume payment" of the workers' compensation 
benefits. 
^ 20 We believe the Board reasonably applied the 
statutory scheme in determining the order in which the 
third party recovery is to be disbursed. Under 
Worthen, the statute's subsections are to be read as a 
whole, and the sequence in which the statute allocates 
funds should be regarded as "having some 
significance": 
If we do as the statute says and make the allocation 
provided for in paragraph [a] first, that is, charging 
the recovery [of] the costs and attorney's fees in 
proportion to the interests of the parties, the 
disbursement stated first is made first, and has 
priority over the provision for disbursement which 
follows it in paragraph [b]. Then the reimbursement 
to the insurer is made from the funds remaining and 
to the extent possible after the first requirement for 
disbursement is complied with. 
Id. at 226. (Emphasis added.) We do not find any 
support in the statutory language or case law for the 
dependents' argument, and indeed, find that the case 
law sets forth the steps that must be taken when 
distributing third-party tort recoveries under section 
34A-2-106(5). See, e.g., Graham v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491 P.2d 223, 224 (1971) 
(holding statute requires each party bear its share of 
attorney fees and expenses before making distribution 
of funds); Worthen, 426 P.2d at 225. Therefore, we 
reject the distribution "formula" proposed by the 
dependents. (FN6) 
II. Discounting of Future Benefits to Present Value 
[3] Tj 21 Finally, the dependents argue the Board 
erred in discounting future benefits to present value 
under Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-4. CNA 
counters that because *445. the dependents failed to 
oppose CNA's request for discounting when it was 
presented to the Board, they have waived their right to 
challenge this portion of the Board's order. 
U 22 "[I]ssues not raised in proceedings before 
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administrative agencies are not subject to judicial 
review except in exceptional circumstances." Brown & 
Root Indus, v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 
(Utah 1997); see also Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik, 
946 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (denying 
consideration of issues first raised on appeal); Alvin G. 
Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984) (precluding party who failed 
to raise issue before administrative agency from raising 
issue on appeal). 
U 23 Although CNA requested present-value 
discounting of its future payment obligation to the 
dependents, the dependents' response did not directly 
address the issue. Because the transcript was not 
included in the record on appeal, it is impossible for us 
to determine whether there was any discussion at the 
hearing regarding this issue. Additionally, the 
dependents' brief has failed to address how this issue 
was preserved for appeal. See Utah R.App. P. 
24(a)(5)(A) ("The brief of the appellant shall contain ... 
a statement of the issues presented for review ... and 
citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court."). Because the issue was 
not raised before the Board, and because the 
dependents' brief on this issue does not conform to our 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the dependents have 
waived their right to appeal this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
% 24 We conclude that the Board reasonably 
determined that Redd Roofing/CNA was responsible 
for 100% of the attorney fees and costs, and that the 
remaining "net" judgment of $68,507.97 would offset 
future workers' compensation amounts owed by CNA. 
Additionally, the dependents waived the issue of 
whether the Board should have permitted CNA to 
discount its future obligation for workers' 
compensation payments to the dependents by eight 
percent under Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-1-4. 
The order of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission is therefore affirmed. 
K 25 BENCH, Judge and GARFF, Senior Judge, 
concur. 
(FN1.) Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-4(2)(1996); Utah Code Jud. Admin. 
R3-108(4). 
(FN2.) This statute was previously numbered § 
35-1-62 (1993). In 1997, the Utah Legislature 
revised Title 35, created Title 34A, and replaced the 
Industrial Commission with the Labor Commission. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-103 (1997). This 
revision resulted in the renumbering of many of the 
sections on workers' compensation. However, 
because the sections in effect at the time of the 
hearing below do not differ materially from current 
statutory provisions, we cite to the most recent 
statutes in this opinion. 
(FN3.) Rule 612-14 provides that 
[e]ight percent shall be used for any discounting or 
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by 
the Commission or for any attorney fees paid in a 
single up-front amount, or of any other sum being 
paid earlier than normally paid under a weekly 
benefit method shall be subject to the 8% 
discounting. 
Utah Admin. Code 612-14 (1998). 
(FN4.) Redd Roofing and CNA claim the dependents 
did not notify them of the Gravely action, nor of 
Gravely's attempt to attribute fault to Redd Roofing, 
in violation Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(3) (1997) 
(requiring that "before proceeding against a third 
party ..., the employee's heirs, shall give written 
notice of the intention to bring an action against the 
third party to: (i) the carrier; and (ii) any other 
person obligated for the compensation payments.") 
(FN5.) Although the dependents assert that the Board's 
application of the governing statute is "unfair" 
because it gives the insurer priority over the 
employee in distributing third-party tort proceeds 
even when it is the employee who brings the action, 
we do not believe the application is unfair when 
viewed in the context of the entire workers' 
compensation scheme. Under our Workers' 
Compensation Act, the insurer guarantees 
compensation to all injured employees covered under 
its insurance, regardless of fault. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2401(2) (1997) (responsibility for 
payment of compensation for employment-related 
injury rests with employer); see id. § 
34A-2-207(l)(a) (1997) (failure to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance subjects employer to liability 
in civil action brought against it by injured 
employee). The insurer is required to pay 
compensation even if the accident is entirely the fault 
of the employee or of an unrelated third party. In 
exchange, however, the insurer receives priority in 
the distribution of any third-party tort proceeds. See 
id § 34A-2-106(5)(b). Thus, the statutory scheme 
ensures that the injured employee receives 
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compensation in some form, which reduces the risk 
the employee might face if forced to file a civil 
liability action against the employer and/or third 
parties. In addition, we agree with CNA that the risk 
of filing an action and ending up with no net benefit 
is the same encountered in every civil action. 
*445_ (FN6.) We note that the formula proposed by 
the dependents is taken from Breen v. Caesars 
Palace, 102 Nev. 79, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev.1986), and 
was adopted under a different third-party tort 
recovery statutory scheme than Utah's. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Mark KING, Petitioner, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH; 
Workers Compensation 
Fund; and Superior Roofing Company, 
Respondents. 
No. 920464-CA. 
March 18, 1993. 
Workers' compensation claimant sought reversal of 
Industrial Commission's order denying him temporary 
total disability compensation during specified period. 
The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that: (1) 
portion of Workers' Compensation Act providing for 
compensation to injured employees does not explicitly 
or implicitly grant discretion to Industrial Commission 
and, thus, Court of Appeals reviews Commission's 
action under that section under Uniform Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) section providing for less 
deferential correction-of-error standard of review, and 
(2) temporary total disability benefits must be paid to 
incarcerated claimant until claimant's medical 
condition has stabilized, absent specific language in 
workers' compensation statutes limiting benefit for 
incarcerated recipients. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Russon, Associate P.J., filed opinion concurring in 
result. 
West Headnotes 
[ 1 ] Administrative Law and Procedure <®^ 676 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(A) In General 
15 Ak676 Record. 
Under Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 
Court of Appeals, when reviewing factual findings, 
examines entire record available to court, not simply 
that which supports findings of administrative law 
judge. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4)(g). 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure <&z?754A 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15 Ak754 Discretion of Administrative Agency 
15Ak754.1 In General. 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure <@::=>786 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak784 Fact Questions 
15Ak786 Conflicting Evidence. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure <S==>788 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak784 Fact Questions 
15Ak788 Determination Supported by Evidence in 
General. 
Court of Appeals' review of factual findings under 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), is not as 
strict as de novo review of proceedings, nor as lenient 
as review for "any competent evidence" to support 
findings, but rather, it simply accords deference to 
agency where two reasonable, yet conflicting, 
conclusions could have been reached. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4)(g). 
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure <S=::=>676 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(A) In General 
15 Ak676 Record. 
Appellant must provide transcript of proceedings if 
he is going to challenge factual findings under Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4)(g); Rules App.Proc, Rule 11(e)(2). 
[4] Administrative Law and Procedure <@===>676 
15A—-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(A) In General 
15 Ak676 Record. 
Petitioner must provide transcript if he argues that 
legal conclusion is unsupported by evidence in case. 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 11(e)(2). 
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure <®=:::>800 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak800 Statutory Questions. 
Where grant of discretion exists, Court of Appeals 
will not disturb agency's interpretation or application of 
agency-specific law unless its determination exceeds 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality. U.C.A.1953, 
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63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii). 
[6] Administrative Law and Procedure ©^800 
15A—-
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak800 Statutory Questions. 
Court of Appeals reviews agency interpretation or 
application of agency-specific statutes where no grant 
of discretion exists under correction-of-error standard. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
[7] Administrative Law and Procedure <S==?741 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General 
15Ak741 In General. 
Standard of review under Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) will vary based on subsection 
claim is brought under and, thus, counsel is strongly 
encouraged to clearly identify under what section 
review is being sought and to identify appropriate 
standard of review under that section. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4). 
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure <@=3::>330 
15A — 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(A) In General 
15Ak330 Statutes, Construction and Application 
Of. 
Explicit grant of discretion to agency to interpret or 
apply agency-specific statutory law, which warrants 
more deferential standard of review, can be found 
when statute specifically authorizes agency to interpret 
or apply statutory language. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4)(d),(h)(i). 
[9] Administrative Law and Procedure <S==>330 
15A — 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(A) In General 
15Ak330 Statutes, Construction and Application 
Of. 
Court of Appeals can find implicit grants of 
discretion to agency to interpret or apply agency-
specific statutory law, warranting more deferential 
standard of review, in broad and generalized statutory 
language, as such language indicates legislative intent 
to delegate interpretative powers to agency. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i). 
[ 10] Statutes <@==>219(2) 
1993) Page 2 
361 — 
3 61VI Construction and Operation 
3 61 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
3 61 k219 Executive Construction 
361k219(2) Existence of Ambiguity. 
If Court of Appeals finds that there are multiple 
permissible interpretations of language in agency-
specific statute, it must defer to agency's policy choice. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i). 
[11] Statutes <S=»219(1) 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
3 61 k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
3 61 k219 Executive Construction 
361k219(l) In General. 
Consideration of agency's expertise and experience is 
relevant in determining whether agency should make 
necessary policy choice and thus be granted deference 
by reviewing court regarding interpretation or 
application of agency-specific statutory law. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i). 
[12] Administrative Law and Procedure <®==>800 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak800 Statutory Questions. 
In determining whether agency has been granted 
discretion to interpret or apply agency-specific 
statutory law, so as to warrant more deferential 
standard of review under Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA), Court of Appeals first 
determines whether legislature explicitly granted 
discretion to agency and, if explicit grant is not found, 
Court examines language of statute and statutory 
framework for implicit grant of discretion. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i). 
[13] Administrative Law and Procedure ®^800 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak800 Statutory Questions. 
Court of Appeals can find explicit grant of discretion 
to agency to interpret or apply agency-specific 
statutory law, warranting more deferential standard of 
review under Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA), in specific statutory' language directing 
agency to define statutory term by regulation and, 
additionally, statute directing agency to interpret or 
apply specific statutory language should be interpreted 
as explicit grant of discretion. U.C.A.1953, 
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63-46b-16(4)(d),(h)(i). 
[14] Administrative *1281 Law and Procedure®^ 
800 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak800 Statutory Questions. 
If statutory language is broad and expansive or 
subject to numerous interpretations, Court of Appeals 
will assume that legislature has chosen to defer to 
policy-making expertise of agency and will find 
implicit grant of discretion to agency to interpret or 
apply statutory law, warranting more deferential 
standard of review under Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i). 
[15] Administrative Law and Procedure <@=:=>800 
15A — 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of 
15Ak800 Statutory Questions. 
Court of Appeals reviews agency action under Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act's (UAPA's) less 
deferential correction of error standard if statutory 
language is unambiguous and court can interpret and 
apply statutory language by traditional methods of 
statutory construction, utilizing its own expertise to 
define legislative intent. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4)(d),(h)(i). 
[ 16] Workers' Compensation <@^=> 1910 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12 Scope and Extent of Review in 
General 
413kl910 In General. 
Portion of Workers' Compensation Act providing for 
compensation to injured employees does not explicitly 
or implicitly grant discretion to Industrial Commission 
and, thus, Court of Appeals reviews Commission's 
action under that section under Uniform Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) section providing for less 
deferential correction-of-error standard of review. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
[17] Workers' Compensation <®=:>865 
413 — 
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability 
413IX(B)4 Temporary and Permanent Disability 
413k864 Temporary Disability Followed by 
Permanent Disability 
413k865 In General. 
"Medical stabilization" for purposes of requirement 
that temporary total workers' compensation benefits 
continue until claimant's condition has stabilized, is 
independent of ability of claimant to return to work. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
[18] Workers' Compensation <§==>839 
413 
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability 
413IX(B)1 In General 
413k839 Duration and Termination of Period. 
Temporary total disability benefits must be paid to 
incarcerated claimant until claimant's medical 
condition has stabilized, absent specific language in 
workers' compensation statutes limiting benefits for 
incarcerated recipients. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
[19] Workers' Compensation <®=::::>45 
413 
4131 Nature and Grounds of Master's Liability 
413k44 Construction and Operation of Statutes in 
General 
413k45 In General. 
Omissions in Workers' Compensation Act are 
significant and statute should be applied according to 
its literal wording. U.C.A.1953, 35-1- to 35-1-107. 
[20] Workers' Compensation <S=>1 
413 — 
4131 Nature and Grounds of Master's Liability 
413kl In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[20] Workers' Compensation <S=>511 
413 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical Harm 
413VIII(A)1 In General 
413k511 In General. 
Workers' Compensation Act is based on contract 
principles and employee's right to benefits arises when 
he suffers work-related injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1- to 
35-1-107. 
[21 ] Workers' Compensation <®=>801 
413 — 
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(A) Basis for Determination of Amount 
413k801 In General. 
Absent explicit statutory provision, Industrial 
Commission is not free to reduce statutorily created 
workers' compensation benefits. U.C.A.1953, 35-1- to 
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35-1-107. 
*1283 Robert Breeze (argued), Salt Lake City, for 
petitioner. 
Richard G. Sumsion (argued), Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
Before BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., and 
RUSSON, Associate P.J. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Mark King seeks reversal of an Order of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying him 
temporary total disability compensation for the period 
of his incarceration at the Utah State Prison and for the 
period after his release until corrective surgery was 
performed. We reverse and remand for the calculation 
and payment of benefits. 
FACTS 
King suffered an on-the-job injury to his wrist on 
November 20, 1989, while working for Superior 
Roofing Company. King received temporary total 
disability benefits from the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Fund from November 21, 1989 through 
May 22, 1990. The Fund also paid medical expenses. 
King was scheduled for surgery to correct his wrist 
injury on May 30, 1990. However, on May 22, 1990, 
King was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison for a 
parole violation. Because of his incarceration, surgery 
was postponed. Temporary total disability 
compensation was terminated during the period of 
King's incarceration and for the period after his release 
until corrective surgery was performed. King was 
released from prison on October 13, 1990. King was 
admitted for surgery on January 29, 1991 and surgery 
was performed on January 30, 1991. Temporary total 
disability compensation resumed on January 29, 1991 
and continued through July 14, 1991, covering the 
period of King's surgery and recovery. 
On July 9, 1991 an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
denied King's claim for temporary total disability 
benefits during the period from May 22, 1990 through 
January 28, 1991. The ALJ further ordered that the 
Workers' Compensation Fund was entitled to a credit 
for all temporary total compensation paid to King after 
May 22, 1990 and before January 29, 1991. The ALJ 
determined King's "loss of wages for the claimed 
period was not related to the industrial accident 
whatsoever, but, rather, was solely due to the actions or 
conduct of the applicant which resulted in his being 
*1284 incarcerated." The Industrial Commission 
affirmed the order of the ALJ. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal, King seeks temporary total disability 
compensation for the period between May 22, 1990 
and January 28, 1991, the period of his incarceration 
and the period after his release until corrective surgery 
was performed. King contends the Industrial 
Commission erroneously interpreted and applied the 
workers' compensation statutes in denying him 
compensation. 
Because the proceedings in this case began after 
January 1, 1988, we review them under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1989 & Supp.1992). 
Judicial review of agency action under UAPA is 
controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). 
Section 4 of that statute enumerates the situations 
under which a court can grant relief. (FN1) Because 
the controlling precedent from the Utah Supreme Court 
is less than clear (FN2) and because of divergence in 
recent opinions of this court over how we discern the 
appropriate standard of review under UAPA, we take 
the opportunity today to discuss the issue in depth. 
Compare Putvin v. Tax Comm'n, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah 
App. 1992) (FN3) (finding grant of discretion in broad 
statutory language without identifying whether it was 
explicit or implicit) with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 847 P.2d 418, 420, n. 6, (Utah App.1993) 
(FN4) (finding no explicit grant of discretion because 
no statutory directive to interpret a term). We feel 
compelled to take this approach due to the admonitions 
this court recently received from the supreme court in 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). In that 
case, which resolved a conflict in this court regarding 
the standard of review applicable in certain criminal 
matters, the supreme court noted its 
uneasiness with the persistence of the division in the 
court of appeals on this [standard of review] issue. 
To the extent that this disagreement simply represents 
an evolution of two conflicting interpretations of the 
same legal doctrine by different panels of judges, its 
persistence is contrary to the doctrine of stare 
decisis.... 
... It is one thing to admit that differences among 
judges on a particular legal question can exist; it is 
quite another to *1285 sanction variability in the 
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rule of law depending solely on which of several 
judges of an appellate court sit on a given case. 
Id. at 1271. Thus, to eliminate any confusion as to 
the analytical model this court is following to 
determine the appropriate standard of review under 
UAPA, we engage in a rather laborious discussion of 
the standard of review. 
A. Issues of Fact 
[1][2] Under UAPA, the standard we apply when 
reviewing factual findings is clear. The only 
subsection under which factual findings can be 
challenged is 63-46b-16(4)(g). Under that subsection, 
we will change a factual finding only if it "is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). Accord Zissi v. Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852-54 (Utah 1992). " 
'Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person 
"might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' " 
Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah 
App. 1992) (quoting Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 
P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 
App. 1989))). To reach our conclusion we examine the 
entire record available to the court, not simply that 
which supports the findings of the ALJ. Id. Thus, 
Petitioner necessarily has the burden of marshaling "all 
of the evidence supporting the findings and show[ing] 
that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence." Grace 
Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. Accord Hales Sand & 
Gravel Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 
1992). This review is not as strict as a de novo review 
of the proceedings, nor as lenient as a review for "any 
competent evidence" to support the findings, it simply 
accords deference to the agency where two reasonable, 
yet conflicting, conclusions could have been reached. 
See Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 & n. 7. 
[3] [4] Additionally, the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure govern how we review agency actions. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(2)(b) (1989). Rule 
11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides: "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is 
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in 
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion." Utah R.App.P. 11(e)(2). 
Rule 11 requires counsel provide the appellate court 
with all evidence pertinent to the issues on appeal. See 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1102 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Thus, our 
procedural rules specifically require a petitioner to 
provide a transcript of the proceedings if he is going to 
challenge factual findings under subsection 
63-46b-16(4)(g). A petitioner must also provide a 
transcript if he argues a legal conclusion is unsupported 
by the evidence in the case. Otherwise we have no 
basis on which to evaluate the findings and 
conclusions. 
B. Issues of General Law 
The standard we apply when an agency interprets or 
applies general law such as case law, constitutional 
law, or non-agency specific legislative acts is also 
clear. Our review in this area is guided by section 
63-46b-16(4)(d). As we did prior to UAPA, we review 
agency interpretations of general law "under a 
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the 
agency's decision." Questar Pipeline Co. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991). See also 
Zissi v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852-54 (Utah 
1992) (holding issues of law are reviewed for 
correctness under § 63-46b-16(4)(d)); Savage Indus., 
Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) 
(finding agency's erroneous interpretation of law is 
grounds for relief under § 63-46b-16(4)(d)). In Morton 
International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991), the supreme court articulated the reason 
for the correction of error *1286 standard is not 
simply because the court characterizes an issue as one 
of general law but because the agency has no special 
experience or expertise placing it in a better position 
than the courts to construe the law. Id. at 586. 
C. Issues of Agency-Specific Law 
[5] [6] We are faced with a far more difficult task in 
deciding the amount of deference to grant an agency's 
interpretation or application of agency-specific 
statutory law. In that instance, we grant deference only 
"when there is a grant of discretion to the agency 
concerning the language in question, either expressly 
made in the statute or implied from the statutory 
language." Id. at 589. (FN5) If there is a grant of 
discretion we review the agency action under Utah 
Code Ann § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1989). See Chicago 
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 (Utah 
1992). Where a grant exists, we will not disturb the 
agency's interpretation or application of the law unless 
its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. Morton, 814 P.2d at 586-87, 589, 592; 
Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah 
App. 1992). "[A]bsent a grant of discretion, a 
correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an 
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agency's interpretation or application of a statutory 
term." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. See also Mor-Flo 
Indus., Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328, 330 
(Utah App.1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1992). In other words, we review agency interpretation 
or application of agency-specific statutes where no 
grant of discretion exists under Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(d). See Bennion v. Graham Resources, 
Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993). 
[7] [8] The difficulty arises in determining whether an 
agency has been granted discretion and thus whether 
our review is governed by section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
In Morton the supreme court reviewed the impact of 
UAPA on the standard of review an appellate court 
should utilize when an agency interprets or applies an 
agency-specific statute. Morton indicates that review 
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) represents a "break 
from prior law." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. (FN6) It 
held "an agency's statutory *1287 construction should 
be given deference when there is a grant of discretion 
to the agency concerning the language in question, 
either expressly made in the statute or implied from the 
statutory language." Id. at 589. However, Morton 
does not detail what the term explicit grant of 
discretion means. In Morton, the example of an 
explicit grant of discretion to an agency relates to the 
Tax Commission deciding whether a piece of 
equipment qualifies for an exemption from the sales 
and use tax. Id. at 588 n. 40. The statute allows the 
exemption if the equipment is a "normal operating 
replacement ... as determined by the commission" 
Utah Code Ann.§ 59-12-104(15) (1992) (emphasis 
added). Thus, an explicit grant of discretion can be 
found when a statute specifically authorizes an agency 
to interpret or apply statutory language. 
[9] [10] Morton also discusses when an implicit grant 
of discretion is present. We can find implicit grants of 
discretion in "broad and generalized" statutory 
language because such language indicates a legislative 
intent to delegate interpretative powers to the agency. 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. Articulated somewhat 
differently, if we find there are multiple permissible 
interpretations of statutory language we must defer to 
the agency's policy choice. Id. at 589. However, if we 
can derive the legislative intent in the statute by 
"traditional methods of statutory construction, [there is 
no implicit grant of discretion and] the agency's 
interpretation will be granted no deference and the 
statute will be interpreted in accord with its legislative 
intent." Id. at 589. 
[11] In one of its more confusing sections^ Morton 
tells us "to the extent that our cases can be read as 
granting deference to an agency's decisions based 
solely on the agency's expertise," they are inconsistent 
with UAPA's command that we defer only on the basis 
of a statutory grant of authority. Morton, 814 P.2d at 
587 (emphasis added). The court then immediately 
responds to this statement by recognizing the changes it 
discusses in standard of review "may not have 
significant effect." Id. We take this to mean that 
consideration of an agency's expertise and experience 
is relevant in determining whether the agency should 
make the necessary policy choice and thus be granted 
deference by the reviewing court. (FN7) Morton 
specifically states it should not be read as holding the 
ways of finding grants of discretion which it discusses 
"are the only methods of determining whether the 
legislature has granted the agency discretion in dealing 
with an issue." Morton, 814 P.2d at 589. 
Morton's directive that we seek out grants of 
discretion before applying the *1288 deferential 
standard of review under 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) has led 
this court to expend significant judicial resources on 
ascertaining the appropriate standard of review in 
appeals from executive agency decisions. Two 
somewhat different approaches have arisen in this court 
following Morton. Given the emerging nature of the 
law, this result is not surprising. 
The approach this court originally took is exemplified 
by Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment Security, 
819 P.2d 361 (Utah App.1991). (FN8) In Tasters, the 
issue was the Department's interpretation and 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) 
(Supp.1989) (current version at id. § 35-4-22.3 
(Supp.1992)). That statute directs the Department to 
consider twenty factors in determining if an individual 
is an employee or an independent contractor. We 
found the language of the statute directing the agency 
to apply the statute "indicates an explicit grant of 
discretion" to the agency to determine whether an 
individual is an employee or an independent contractor. 
Tasters, 819 P.2d at 364. The language the court 
relied on provided: "unless it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the commission," the "[commission 
determines that the] weight of the evidence supports 
the finding" and "considered [by the commission] if 
applicable." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 
35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp.1989)). Thus, the statute in which 
we found an explicit grant of discretion authorized the 
commission to apply specific statutory language. 
Other panels have followed the analysis used in 
Tasters. Recently, in Putvin v. Tax Commission, 837 
P.2d 589 (Utah App. 1992), (FN9) the case turned on 
whether the petitioner met the statutory definition of 
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nonresident for Tax Code purposes. We held the Tax 
Commission's determination was entitled to deference. 
In doing so, we recognized a general grant of authority 
to the Tax Commission to administer the statutes under 
which it operates and that the Tax Commission often 
makes determinations of residency status. Id. at 590. 
Thus, it could be argued we found an explicit grant of 
discretion. We also, however, recognized factors that 
would support a conclusion an implicit grant of 
discretion had been given. First, we acknowledged 
neither the statutory context nor normal statutory 
construction were helpful in determining what the 
legislature intended. Id. at 591. Second, we 
recognized the statutory term was subject to several 
possible interpretations and had been defined by 
detailed administrative regulations. Id. Thus, 
interpretation of the statute was better left to the policy 
expertise of the Commission. (FN 10) 
While we have not always articulated why we have 
found a grant of discretion or whether the discretion 
should be characterized as explicit or implicit, the 
result has been consistent with Morton. In each case 
the language of the statute and the statutory scheme 
support a finding of at least an implicit grant of 
discretion. For example, in Johnson-Bowles Co. v. 
Department of Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah App.), 
(FN11) cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), we 
granted deference to the agency where its statutory 
scheme provided the executive director could penalize 
a broker "if he finds that" the broker has "engaged in 
dishonest or unethical" practices. Id. at 114 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) (1989)). We held such 
language "bespeaks a legislative intent to delegate the 
interpretation of what constitutes dishonest and 
unethical practices in the securities industry...." *I289 
Id. Hence, although we did not articulate it, what we 
did under Morton was find the statutory language 
"broad and expansive" and capable of multiple 
interpretations thus indicating an implicit grant of 
discretion by the legislature. 
Likewise, in Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 
P.2d 448 (Utah App.1991), (FN12) we did not 
articulate the exact step under the Morton analysis 
where we found the agency had been granted discretion 
by the legislature. In Swider, an aircraft mechanic had 
been discharged from employment at Hill Air Force 
Base for drug use. He applied for unemployment 
benefits and after a hearing by an ALJ was granted 
them. The Board of Review upheld the ALJ's decision. 
The Air Force challenged the Board's conclusion the 
defendant was not " 'culpable' for the purposes of 
establishing a 'just cause' termination." Id. at 450. We 
found statutory language permitting a denial of benefits 
if a termination was for " 'just cause ... if so found by 
the commission' " constituted the requisite grant of 
discretion. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Utah Code Ann § 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1991)). Under 
Morton, this was the appropriate result because the 
operative language authorized the Board to interpret 
and apply specific statutory language. As the supreme 
court noted would often be the case, the standard of 
review is the same as that we would have applied under 
the prior approach where we granted deference based 
on agency expertise. Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. See 
also Bhatia v. Department of Employment Sec.; 834 
P.2d 574, 577 (Utah App.1992) (FN13) (following 
Swider ); Robinson v. Department of Employment 
Sec, 827 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App.1992) (FN14) 
(finding explicit grant of discretion based on statutory 
language authorizing agency to determine issue of 
"voluntariness" and "good cause"). See also 
Valgardson Housing Sys. Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 849 
P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah App. 1993) (finding implicit 
grant of discretion in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) 
(1987)). 
Recently, Judge Bench has articulated a slightly 
different view of the appropriate analysis mandated by 
Morton. Under his reading, the first question is 
whether there is an explicit grant of discretion to the 
agency. (FN15) Ferro v. Department of Commerce, 
828 P.2d 507, 510 & n. 5 (Utah App.1992) (FN16) 
(citing Morton, 814 P.2d at 589). If there is an 
explicit grant of discretion *1290 the court applies a 
deferential standard of review. Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 581 
(Bench, P.J., concurring). As one of the keys to this 
analysis, Judge Bench has indicated what he thinks the 
supreme court meant when it spoke of "explicit grants 
of discretion." In his view, that term means the 
"legislature must direct or authorize the agency to 
define the statutory term by rule." Id. (FN 17) If no 
explicit grant exists then the court determines whether 
the statute is ambiguous. Ferro, 828 P.2d at 510. If 
not, the court "applies the statute according to its plain 
meaning." Id. If the statute is ambiguous the court 
attempts to apply the traditional rules of statutory 
construction. Id. If it can do so, and divine the intent 
of the legislature, it applies a correction of error 
standard. Id. If traditional statutory construction does 
not produce a legislative intent the court will then 
assume the legislature intended for the agency to make 
a judgment concerning the appropriate policy and find 
an implicit grant of discretion. Id. at 510-11. 
There are two major distinctions between the analysis 
Judge Bench has recently advocated and that applied in 
some earlier cases. First, opinions applying the earlier 
analysis have found explicit legislative grants of 
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discretion in statutory language which is much broader 
than simply a legislative directive to define a term by 
rule. Second, rather than applying plain meaning and 
other statutory construction methods as independent 
steps in the analysis, the earlier opinions use statutory 
construction as a tool in deciding whether the statute 
contains an implicit grant of discretion. 
We turn now to Utah Supreme Court cases to 
determine whether they have applied the analysis 
articulated by Judge Bench or the broader one used in 
the earlier opinions issued by this court. Morton itself 
provides the answer. In footnote 40, the court gives the 
following example of an explicit grant of discretion by 
the legislature. 
For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides for 
"sales or leases of machinery and equipment 
purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use in new 
or expanding operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements ... as determined by the commission)." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589 n. 40. This illustration does 
not show a specific legislative directive to define a 
statutory term by rule as Judge Bench would require. 
Rather, it is a grant of authority to the commission to 
interpret or apply statutory language. This language 
constitutes the explicit grant of discretion that requires 
a reviewing court to apply an intermediate standard of 
review to agency action under the statute. 
Additionally, Morton twice states the question the 
court is reviewing is one of "statutory construction or 
application, and absent a grant of discretion, the 
Commission's decision will be reviewed" for 
correctness. Id. at 589 & 592 (emphasis added). Thus, 
it is not simply interpretation or definition of statutory 
language we review under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), 
but application of that language as well. Moreover, 
Morton discusses agency actions in terms of "dealing 
with statutory terms" and "dealing with an issue," not 
"interpreting" or "defining" statutory terms. See id. at 
588 & 589. Likewise, nothing in the language of 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) supports the limitation 
Judge Bench proposes. Consequently, Morton refutes 
a cornerstone of Judge Bench's analysis, that an 
explicit grant of discretion can only be found in 
language directing the agency to define a statutory term 
by rule. 
Furthermore, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tax 
Commission, 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992), a post Morton 
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court applies the broader 
analysis. In that case the railroad challenged *1291 
some determinations of the Tax Commission. The 
court, without identifying whether it found an explicit 
or implicit grant of discretion, held the Commission 
had discretion to interpret the statutory terms "repairs" 
and "renovations." Id. at 883-84. Regardless of 
whether the supreme court found an explicit grant or an 
implicit grant, it looked for a grant of discretion prior 
to construing the statute on its own, as have our earlier 
opinions. 
In addition, the court has frequently found implicit 
grants of discretion and has not applied statutory 
construction as a separate step in its analysis. See, e.g., 
BJ-Titan Serv. v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 822, 827-28, 
(Utah 1992) (holding Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(1) 
(Supp.1986) (current version at id. § 59-12-103(l)(a) 
(1992)) contains implicit grant of discretion); Chicago 
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 
306-08 (Utah 1992) (applying reasonableness review 
to Tax Commission's determination individual is a 
"real property contractor" because such determination 
is based in part on law and in part on fact). As with 
our earlier opinions, the supreme court uses statutory 
construction as a tool in ascertaining whether an 
implicit grant of discretion exists. See, e.g., Nucor 
Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992) 
(applying reasonableness review to agency's 
interpretation of statutory language based on implicit 
grant because language subject to multiple 
interpretations). 
[12][13] We now articulate the analytical model we 
have derived from Morton for determining if the more 
deferential standard of 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) is to be 
utilized in reviewing an agency action. This model 
applies in all UAPA cases dealing with either the 
interpretation or application of agency-specific law by 
an agency. First, we determine whether the legislature 
explicitly granted discretion to the agency to interpret 
or apply statutory language at issue. As Judge Bench 
has rightly noted, we can find an explicit grant of 
discretion in specific statutory language directing the 
agency to define a statutory term by regulation. 
Additionally, a statute directing the agency to interpret 
or apply specific statutory language should be 
interpreted as an explicit grant of discretion. If we find 
such a grant, we review under section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. That is, we 
afford the agency some deference and assess whether 
its action is within the bounds of reasonableness. 
[14] [15] Second, if we do not find an explicit grant of 
discretion, we examine the language of the statute and 
the statutory framework for an implicit grant of 
discretion. (FN 18) If the statutory language is broad 
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and expansive or subject to numerous interpretations 
we will assume the legislature has chosen to defer to 
the policy making expertise of the agency and we will 
find an implicit grant of discretion and review the 
action under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of 
discretion. If, on the other hand, the language is 
unambiguous and we can interpret and apply the 
statutory language by the traditional methods of 
statutory construction, utilizing our own expertise to 
divine the legislative intent, we review the agency 
action under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of 
error. 
[16] Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) is the portion 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act at issue here. 
Without articulating the analysis we have set out 
above, we have previously held "section 35-1-45 does 
not expressly or impliedly grant discretion to the 
Industrial Commission...." Cross v. Board of Review, 
824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 1992). Accord Stokes 
v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992). 
This holding is in harmony with the analysis we 
explain today. 
Section 35-1-45 does not contain a directive to 
interpret or apply a statutory *1292 term. Thus, it 
does not contain an explicit grant of discretion. 
Further, because the language is not broad and 
expansive but is narrow and mandatory and is subject 
to construction by traditional rules of statutory 
construction, the statute does not contain an implicit 
grant of discretion. We, therefore, review the 
Industrial Commission's action under section 35-1-45 
under UAPA section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correctness. 
Accord Stokes, 832 P.2d at 58; Cross, 824 P.2d at 
1204. 
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION 
On appeal, King claims he has been denied his 
statutory right to temporary total disability 
compensation. The Industrial Commission argues 
King was appropriately denied benefits because the 
extended period of his disability was due to his 
"incarceration and the unavailability of medical care, 
circumstances over which the defendants had no 
control." The Industrial Commission concedes that 
workers' compensation benefits should not be 
terminated merely as a result of incarceration. Instead, 
the Commission, in denying benefits, focuses on the 
extension of the period of King's disability as a result 
of his incarceration. 
A. Workers' Compensation Act 
Workers' compensation is a statutorily-created 
benefit. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-1 to -107 (1988 
& Supp.1992). Section 35-1-45 is the provision of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act relevant in the 
instant case. It provides: 
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, 
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services and medicines.... The 
responsibility for compensation and payment of 
medical, nursing, and hospital services and 
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this 
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance 
carrier and not on the employee. 
Id § 35-1-45 (1988) (emphasis added). 
[17] Once awarded, temporary total workers' 
compensation benefits "are to continue 'until [the 
claimant's] condition has stabilized.' " Booms v. Rapp 
Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 
1981)). Medical stabilization is the time when " 'the 
period of healing has ended and the condition of the 
claimant will not materially improve.' " Reddish v. 
Sentinel Consumer Prod, 111 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah 
App. 1989) (quoting Booms, 720 P.2d at 1366). "When 
a claimant reaches medical stabilization, he is no 
longer eligible for temporary benefits and his status 
must be reassessed." Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n, 
754 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah App.1988). Medical 
stabilization is independent of the ability of the 
claimant to return to work. Reddish, 111 P.2d at 1104. 
Thus, "temporary disability benefits are properly 
discontinued as soon as the point of medical 
stabilization is reached, regardless of whether the 
claimant is actually able to return to work." Id. 
King's injury did not achieve medical stabilization 
until corrective surgery was performed. During the 
period of his incarceration he was not medically 
stabilized. Therefore, unless an exception is applied, 
under the Utah workers' compensation scheme, King 
qualifies for benefits for the period of his incarceration 
and the period after his release until corrective surgery 
was performed. 
B. Incarceration 
[18] Whether a claimant who is not medically 
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stabilized may be denied temporary total disability 
compensation while incarcerated is an issue of first 
impression in Utah. Other jurisdictions are split on the 
issue of whether one receiving workers' compensation 
benefits loses those benefits *1293 upon 
incarceration. However, many courts which have 
considered the issue have concluded disability benefits 
should be paid to an incarcerated claimant. (FN 19) A 
review of the reasoning articulated by some of the 
courts awarding benefits is helpful in our resolution of 
this first impression issue. 
In re Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1986), is a 
particularly well-reasoned decision. In Spera, the 
claimant received temporary total disability payments 
until January 21, 1985, the date the district court 
learned he had been incarcerated. The court ordered 
the suspension of further payments while the claimant 
remained in jail. The district judge reasoned 
incarceration, rather than the work-related injury, was 
the legal intervening cause of his lost wages. (FN20) 
In reversing the district court's suspension of payments, 
the Wyoming Supreme Court held a worker's 
incarceration does not require a suspension of 
temporary total disability payments. Id. at 1158. 
Stressing that workers' compensation law is based on 
"contract" rather than tort principles, the Spera court 
held the worker's right to benefits arises when he 
suffers a work-related injury. See id. at 1156-57. The 
court explained the Wyoming workers' compensation 
scheme "is based on a concept of industrial insurance," 
which means "it is based on contract rather than tort 
principles." Id. at 1156. Under contract principles the 
worker should not be denied benefits unless a provision 
in the statutory contract between the worker, the state, 
and the employer explicitly suspends the benefits. The 
court explains: 
Instead of suing his employer for negligence and 
having to prove duty, breach, proximate cause, and 
damages, the worker in our state must file for 
worker's compensation benefits for which his 
employer is ultimately liable. Essentially, the system 
provides disability insurance coverage for the worker. 
His right to benefits arises when certain conditions 
precedent occur, primarily, when he suffers a 
disabling work-related injury. Under contract 
principles, the worker should not be denied his 
benefits after the contingency arises, unless a 
provision in the statutory contract between the 
worker, on the one hand, and the State and employer, 
on the other, explicitly suspends the benefits. 
... Benefits under the statute terminate only when 
1993) Page 10 
the worker recovers because only then does he regain 
his earning power. Incarceration has no effect upon 
benefits which are in the nature of insurance which 
has become payable as a covered loss.... 
*1294 .... 
... The worker's disability payments cannot be 
characterized as mere governmental largesse that can 
be eliminated when the worker's needs are fulfilled 
from another governmental source. Rather, the 
worker's statutory right to disability payments is akin 
to a contract right. Nobody would argue, in the 
private insurance context, that an insurer could 
withhold payments due under an insurance contract 
just because the insured had a second policy which 
covered the same disability.... 
We believe this same principle should apply to 
industrial insurance created by statute. Because there 
is no statutory exception which eliminates benefits 
when a worker is jailed, the benefits are due the 
worker even if his needs are fulfilled from another 
governmental source. The state legislature can 
change our statute to suspend payments during 
periods of incarceration, much like a private insurer 
might place conditions on his coverage. But in the 
absence of legislation, we decline the State's 
invitation to make that policy shift ourselves. 
Id. at 1157-58 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Bear den v. Industrial Commission, 14 
Ariz.App. 336, 483 P.2d 568 (1971), the claimant was 
awarded temporary disability for a compensable 
industrial injury and then incarcerated in the Arizona 
State Prison following a felony conviction. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the denial of 
benefits and held the right to workers' compensation 
was not forfeited or suspended during a period of 
incarceration. See id., 14 Ariz.App. at 343, 483 P.2d at 
575. In reaching this conclusion, the Bearden court 
reviewed relevant provisions of Arizona's workers' 
compensation statutes. Arizona's statutes simply 
provided that benefits "shall be paid." Id. at 341, 483 
P.2d at 573. The court enumerated provisions of the 
statutes which suspended or reduced workers' 
compensation under specified circumstances. As with 
Utah's statutes, Arizona's statutes contained no 
provision for the forfeiture or suspension of workers' 
compensation benefits based on incarceration. The 
court stated "the Arizona Legislature has not provided 
for the forfeiture or suspension of compensation and 
accident benefits during the period of the prison 
confinement of a claimant serving a sentence less than 
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life." Id. The Bearden court concluded: 
No constitutional or statutory provision relating 
directly to workmen's compensation has been brought 
to our attention which declares that a person whose 
civil rights are suspended ... thereby forfeits his right 
to compensation.... Whether that should be the law is 
a matter of public policy which should be determined 
by the Legislature. 
Id. at 341-42, 483 P.2d at 573-74. 
Likewise, in Forshee & Langley Logging v. 
Peckham, 100 Or.App. 717, 788 P.2d 487 (1990), the 
claimant was awarded temporary total disability 
compensation prior to incarceration. Like King, the 
claimant in Forshee was neither medically stabilized 
nor released for regular work during the period of his 
incarceration. In affirming the award of benefits, the 
absence of legislation specifically terminating benefits 
upon incarceration was significant to . the Forshee 
court. "It is the legislature's province to restrict the 
ability of incarcerated individuals to collect workers' 
compensation and, in some situations, it has done so. 
We decline employer's suggestion that we create 
additional exceptions that have no basis in the statute." 
Id. 788 P.2d at 488 (citation & footnote omitted). 
Thus, the absence of a provision in the state's 
workers' compensation statutes specifically denying 
disability benefits to claimants during periods of 
incarceration is a significant factor in the analysis of 
many courts when awarding benefits to incarcerated 
claimants. (FN21) As with numerous other 
jurisdictions, Utah's Workers' Compensation *1295 
Act has no provision terminating benefits because of a 
claimant's incarceration. 
[19] Omissions in the Workers' Compensation Act 
are significant and the "statute should be applied 
according to its literal wording." Traylor Bros., Inc./ 
Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Utah 
App. 1987). Significantly, as noted in their caselaw, 
several states have enacted legislation which 
specifically terminates workers' compensation benefits 
after a claimant has been incarcerated. (FN22) 
Furthermore, the Utah Legislature has chosen to 
restrict workers' compensation benefits under certain 
circumstances. For example, section 35-1-14 provides 
for a fifteen percent reduction in compensation for an 
employee's failure to use safety devices, failure to obey 
employer's safety rule, or employee's intoxication. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-14 (1988). Similarly, section 
35-1-45 suspends benefits when the accident was 
"purposely self-inflicted." Id. § 35-1-45. Thus, it is 
clear the Utah Legislature knows how to limit workers' 
compensation benefits, and does so when it so desires. 
[20] [21] We therefore hold the absence of a statutory 
provision limiting workers' compensation benefits upon 
a claimant's incarceration mandates a conclusion that 
temporary total benefits should be awarded to King. 
Moreover, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is 
based on contract principles and an employee's right to 
benefits arises when he suffers a work-related injury. 
Absent an explicit statutory provision, the Industrial 
Commission is not free to reduce statutorily-created 
benefits. "The Industrial Commission is not free to 
'legislate' in areas apparently overlooked by our 
lawmakers or to exercise power not expressly or 
impliedly granted to it by the legislature, even in the 
name of fairness." Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 
P.2d 573, 578 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Utah, workers' compensation is the employee's 
exclusive remedy against an employer for an industrial 
injury, a fact which further supports an award of 
benefits to King. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 
(1988). Under our statutory scheme, King relinquished 
his right to sue his employer for his industrial injury in 
exchange for workers' compensation benefits. King's 
incarceration would not have cost him the right to sue 
his employer under the common law. Absent 
legislative action, that incarceration should not cost 
him his right to workers' compensation. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund contends Griffith 
v. Industrial Commission, *1296 754 P.2d 981 (Utah 
App. 1988), supports the denial of benefits in this case. 
In Griffith, we affirmed a denial of benefits where the 
claimant's disability was prolonged due to a delay in 
corrective surgery for reasons unrelated to the 
industrial accident. However, the Industrial 
Commission's reliance on Griffith is misplaced. 
In Griffith, the claimant received temporary total 
disability benefits for an industrial injury to his ankle. 
An orthopedic surgeon evaluated his ankle and 
recommended surgical reconstruction. The 
Commission concluded the healing period had ended 
and the claimant's medical condition had stabilized. 
An internist who evaluated the claimant's hypertension 
and asthma advised that ankle surgery be postponed 
until the hypertension and asthma were treated. The 
Industrial Commission determined the employer was 
not liable for temporary total disability for the period 
which the claimant's hypertension and asthma had to be 
controlled so surgery could be safely performed. The 
Commission reasoned that surgical repair had to be 
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delayed because of other medical problems, not for 
further treatment of claimant's ankle. In affirming the 
Commission's denial of temporary total disability, we 
found "that the Commission's conclusion that plaintiffs 
ankle injury had reached medical stability on May 2, 
1985 ... [was] not arbitrary and capricious because ... 
[it was] supported by substantial evidence on the 
record." Id. at 984. 
Unlike King, in Griffith the claimant's condition had 
reached stabilization, a prerequisite for termination of 
temporary total disability payments. See Booms v. 
Rapp Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986). 
Accord Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 
1021, 1022 (Utah 1986); Reddish v. Sentinel 
Consumer Prod, 111 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah 
App. 1989). In Griffith, workers' compensation benefits 
were properly discontinued. Thus, Griffith provides no 
support for the Industrial Commission's argument. 
Counsel for the Workers' Compensation Fund also 
suggests we should adopt a rule that as long as 
circumstances which delay the claimant's surgery are 
beyond the control of the insurer, the insurer should not 
be required to pay temporary total disability 
compensation. Such a rule, however, makes no sense. 
It would permit the insurer to terminate benefits 
whenever they deem the claimant's surgery to be 
sufficiently "delayed," resulting in subjective and 
arbitrary determinations. (FN23) Would the Industrial 
Commission terminate benefits if King's surgery was 
delayed only eight days instead of eight months? 
Indeed, at oral argument counsel for the Industrial 
Commission indicated that if King's disability had been 
prolonged for a shorter period the Commission would 
not have challenged the payment of disability benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Utah's Workers' Compensation statutes do 
not have specific language limiting benefits for 
incarcerated recipients of temporary total disability 
payments, such benefits must be paid until the 
claimant's medical condition has stabilized. The 
termination of benefits is a policy matter which must be 
addressed by the Utah Legislature, not by this court or 
by the Industrial Commission. Accordingly, we 
reverse the Industrial Commission's ruling and remand 
this matter for determination of benefits. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurring. 
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge (concurring in 
result): 
I concur in the result. We have previously set forth 
the proper standard of review *1297. for appeals from 
the Industrial Commission's denial of compensation 
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) in Cross v. 
Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202, 1203-04 (Utah 
App. 1992). At the time of that decision, the proper 
post-UAPA standard of review for appeals under 
section 35-1-45 was an issue of first impression in 
Utah. In Cross, we determined that section 35-1-45 
contained no express or implied grant of discretion to 
the Industrial Commission. Id. at 1204. That decision 
stands unchallenged as the correct law on the very 
point raised in this case, and the majority expressly 
acknowledges this in its opinion. Thus, in light of 
Cross, and the doctrine of stare decisis as enunciated in 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-71 (Utah 
1993), I find the majority's protracted examination of 
the appropriate standard of review in this case 
unwarranted. 
(FN1.) That section provides: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure 
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination 
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency 
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by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for 
the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). 
(FN2.) Cf. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1267-71 
(Utah 1993) (acknowledging supreme court's failure 
to clearly articulate standards of review). 
(FN3.) Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson 
and Russon concurring. 
(FN4.) Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge Garff 
concurring and Judge Russon concurring in the result 
only. 
(FN5.) Prior to UAPA we reviewed agency 
determinations under three distinct categories. While 
the standards for factual determinations and 
interpretations of general law remain the same, it is 
this intermediate area of scrutiny that has changed. 
Formerly 
agency decisions involving mixed questions of law 
and fact or the application of specific factual 
situations to the legislative enactments under which 
the agency operates were to be given deference by the 
courts and were to be upheld so long as they fell 
within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
Savage Indus., Inc. v. Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664, 
667 (Utah 1991). We spent far less time grappling 
with the standard of review under this relatively 
simple analysis. The complexities involved in the 
new analysis seem not, in the end, to make a 
significant enough difference for the amount of 
energy we expend. 
(FN6.) Appeals under the various subsections of 
63-46b-16(4) are subject to various standards of 
review. For example, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. 
v. Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992), the 
railroad challenged some determinations of the Tax 
Commission. One challenge was to a rule of the 
Commission under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii). 
Citing a pre-UAPA case the court held that rules 
promulgated by the agency and departures from those 
rules will be upheld if they are reasonable and 
rational. Id. at 878-80. The court engaged in no 
discussion of explicit or implicit grants of discretion. 
The court also held the railroad's challenge to the 
constitutionality of a sales tax under section 
63-46b-16(4)(a) would be reviewed for correctness. 
M a t 880-81. 
Thus, Morton applies only when we are ascertaining 
whether an appeals is brought under section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) or 63-46b-16(4)(d). See also 
Nucor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1992) (noting review for abuse of agency discretion 
was under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)); Anderson v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) 
(noting review of claims that agency action was 
arbitrary and capricious under section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) is for reasonableness). Because 
the standard of review under UAPA will vary based 
on the subsection the claim is brought under, we 
strongly encourage counsel to clearly identify under 
what section review is being sought and to make 
certain they identify the appropriate standard of 
review under that section. Cf. Bhatia v. Department 
of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 581-82 (Utah 
App. 1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring) (encouraging 
counsel to present an appropriate statutory 
construction in UAPA cases). 
*1297_ (FN7.) This conclusion that agency expertise 
and experience remain appropriate considerations 
when assessing whether to grant deference is 
supported by Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Tax 
Commission, 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993) and Board 
of Equalization v. Tax Commission, 846 P.2d 1292 
(Utah 1993). In both cases, the supreme court cites a 
pre-Morton non-UAPA case, Chris & Dick's Lumber 
& Hardware v. Tax Commission, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 
1990), for the proposition that "[w]e give no 
deference to an administrative agency's interpretation 
of a statute absent certain circumstances, none of 
which exist here." Sanders, at 1305; Board of 
Equalization, at 1295-96. The circumstances 
referenced in Chris & Dick's are those instances 
where the agency's expertise should be deferred to. 
Chris & Dick's, 791 P.2d at 513-14. 
Further, a footnote in Zissi v. Tax Commission, 842 
P.2d 848 (Utah 1992), a post-Morton UAPA case, 
also supports this conclusion. In that footnote the 
supreme court rejects applying an intermediate 
standard of review based in part on the rationale that 
"the issues are questions of constitutional law and 
statutory construction on which the Commission's 
experience and expertise will be of no real 
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assistance." Id. at 860 n. 2. The Zissi footnote relies 
on Silver v. Tax Commission, 820 P.2d 912 (Utah 
1991), and Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 
212 (Utah 1992), to support this proposition. Silver 
is a pre-UAPA case and Sandy City did not involve 
an agency of the state, thus, UAPA would not apply 
even if that case arose today. 
Sanders, Board of Equalization, and Zissi all indicate 
agency experience and expertise are still relevant 
considerations in deciding whether there is a grant of 
discretion in cases arising under UAPA. 
(FN8.) Opinion by Judge Jackson with Judges Garff 
and Greenwood concurring. 
(FN9.) Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson 
and Russon concurring. 
(FN 10.) Judge Bench has expressed a concern that 
what we did in Putvin was find an explicit grant of 
discretion to the Tax Commission by virtue of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1992). See Belnorth 
Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 
268-69 n. 5 (Utah App. 1993). We agree the 
discretion we found in Putvin is better characterized 
as an implicit grant under Morton. 
(FN11.) Opinion by Judge Russon with Judges 
Jackson and Orme concurring. 
(FN 12.) Opinion by Judge Orme with Judges Jackson 
and Russon concurring. 
(FN 13.) Opinion by Judge Billings with Judge Garff 
concurring and Judge Bench concurring with opinion. 
(FN14.) Opinion by Judge Garff with Judges 
Greenwood and Russon concurring. 
(FN 15.) Creative counsel might read Judge Bench's 
dissent in Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811 
(Utah App. 1992) and his concurrence in Bhatia as 
indicating we must look to see if the statute is 
unambiguous before we look for an explicit grant of 
discretion. See Luckau, 840 P.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J., 
dissenting); Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 581 n. 4 (Bench, 
P.J., concurring). 
The Luckau dissent cites language from Ferro v. 
Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507 (Utah 
App. 1992) regarding implicit grants of discretion in 
its assertion that ambiguity is the first step. See 
Luckau, 840 P.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J., dissenting). In 
Ferro, the language cited in Luckau came after Judge 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 
i. 1993) Page 14 
Bench's discussion of explicit grants of discretion and 
before his discussion of implicit grants of discretion. 
See Ferro, 828 P.2d at 510. The Bhatia footnote 
cites Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. v. Board of Review, 
817 P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991) to support the 
assertion: "We may not defer to an agency's 
interpretation until we know the legislature itself did 
not render its own discernable statutory 
interpretation." Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 581 n. 4 (Bench, 
P.J., concurring). While this language could be 
interpreted as requiring an assessment of ambiguity 
first, it does not appear to be what was intended. If 
we followed that analysis, we would attempt to 
interpret the statute whether there was a grant of 
discretion to the agency or not. 
Thus, we believe there is agreement that the court's 
first task is to look for an explicit grant of discretion. 
If we were to ignore an explicit grant of discretion 
and apply a plain language test first, we would ignore 
the legislature's intent to grant the agency discretion. 
Therefore, counsel should not read Luckau, Bhatia, 
and Mor-Flo as requiring this court to assess 
ambiguity prior to assessing whether a grant of 
discretion exists. 
*1297_ (FN16.) Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge 
Russon concurring and Judge Billings concurring in 
the result only. 
(FN 17.) See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 
847 P.2d 418, 420, n. 6 (Utah App. 1993) (Opinion 
by Bench, J.; Garff, J., concurring; Russon, J., 
concurring in the result) (finding no explicit grant 
under Judge Bench's definition); Belnorth Petroleum 
Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 267-69 (Utah 
App. 1993) (Opinion by Bench, J.; Garff and 
Russon, JJ., concurring) (same). 
(FN 18.) We note, as the court did in Morton, the ways 
we articulate of finding a legislative grant of 
discretion are not exhaustive. In the appropriate 
circumstances we could find a grant of discretion via 
an analysis yet unarticulated. See Morton, 814 P.2d 
at 589 (noting other methods of finding deference 
might arise). 
(FN19.) See, e.g., United Riggers Erectors v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ariz. 258, 640 P.2d 189 
(App. 1981) (awarding benefits because incarceration 
was not voluntary removal from job market and there 
was no legislation taking away these benefits); 
Bearden v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Ariz.App. 336, 
483 P.2d 568 (1971) (holding right to workers' 
compensation not forfeited during incarceration if 
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sentence less than life because no statute so provides 
and this is an issue which should be determined by 
the legislature); Crawford v. Midwest Steel Co., 517 
So.2d 918 (La.App.1987) (holding claimant entitled 
to benefits despite incarceration because statute does 
not provide otherwise); DeMars v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 99 Mich.App. 842, 298 N.W.2d 645, 
647 (1980) (affirming total disability compensation 
despite felony conviction because denial of benefits 
under such a situation "is not the province of the 
Board or the judicial branch"); Forshee & Langley 
Logging v. Peckham, 100 Or.App. 717, 788 P.2d 487 
(1990) (holding claimant entitled to temporary total 
disability during incarceration because he was never 
medically stationary nor released for work during 
incarceration); Last v. MSI Constr. Co., 305 S.C. 
349, 409 S.E.2d 334 (1991) (awarding incarcerated 
claimant temporary total disability benefits); In re 
Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1986) (holding under 
contract principles incarcerated claimant should not 
be denied temporary total benefits, which under the 
statute terminate only when the worker recovers and 
regains his earning power). But see State ex rel. 
Grennan v. Barry, 71 Ohio App.3d 385, 594 N.E.2d 
51 (1991) (holding employee not entitled to 
compensation during period of incarceration); State 
ex rel. Ashcraft v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Ohio St.3d 
42, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987) (denying temporary total 
disability compensation because incarceration was 
"voluntary" act removing claimant from work force). 
(FN20.) Similarly, the ALJ denied King benefits on 
the basis his incarceration was an intervening cause. 
(FN21.) The absence of specific legislation providing 
for suspension of workers' compensation benefits 
upon a claimant's incarceration is a significant factor 
to courts from other jurisdictions awarding benefits to 
temporarily disabled incarcerated claimants. See 
Bearden, 14 Ariz.App. at 341-42, 483 P.2d at 573-74 
(deciding terminating temporary total benefits was 
matter of public policy which should be determined 
by legislature); Forshee, 788 P.2d at 488 (reasoning 
legislature's province to restrict ability of incarcerated 
individuals to collect workers' compensation); In re 
Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1986) (holding 
determination of when payments should be suspended 
is matter that should be left to legislature). 
Likewise, the absence of legislation providing for 
suspension of workers' compensation benefits during 
incarceration is also important in the analysis of 
courts which awarded benefits to permanently 
disabled claimants who were incarcerated. See 
United Riggers, 640 P.2d at 193 (awarding benefits 
because incarceration was not voluntary removal 
from job market and there was no legislation taking 
away these benefits); Crawford v. Midwest Steel Co., 
517 So.2d 918 (La.App.1987) (holding claimant 
entitled to benefits despite incarceration because 
statute does not provide otherwise). See also 
DeMars, 298 N.W.2d at 647 (affirming total 
disability compensation despite felony conviction 
because denial of benefits under such a situation "is 
not the province of the Board or the judicial branch"). 
But see Packard v. Donald Sperry & Sons, 331 
N.Y.S.2d 126, 39 A.D.2d 622 (N.Y.App.Div.1972) 
(holding claimant not entitled to compensation during 
incarceration); White v. Industrial Comm'n, No. 
L-92-040, 1992 WL 348158 (Ohio App. Nov. 27, 
1992) (suspending permanent total disability benefits 
because incarceration amounted to a voluntary 
abandonment of work). 
*1297__ (FN22.) See, e.g., White v. Industrial Comm'n, 
No. L-92-040, 1992 WL 348158 (Ohio App. Nov. 
27, 1992); Wood v. Beatrice Foods Co., 813 P.2d 
821 (Colo.App.1991); Jones v. Department of 
Corrections, 185 Mich.App. 65, 460 N.W.2d 229 
(1990). 
(FN23.) For example, under such a rule, an insurer 
could terminate a claimant's temporary total disability 
compensation if only one surgeon had the skill to 
perform corrective surgery but was unable to 
schedule surgery for three months or was unavailable 
because he was called to active service as a member 
of the military reserves. 
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Certiorari Denied Oct. 17, 1996. 
Claim for workers' compensation benefits was filed. 
Industrial Commission reversed administrative law 
judge's (ALJ) award of permanent total disability 
benefits. Claimant sought judicial review. The Court 
of Appeals, Orme, P.J., held that: (1) Commission's 
finding, under odd lot doctrine, that claimant could be 
rehabilitated was not supported by residuum of 
nonhearsay evidence, and (2) employer failed to meet 
its burden, under odd lot doctrine, of proving existence 
of regular, steady work that claimant could perform. 
Reversed and remanded with instructions. 
Billings, J., concurred in result. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Workers' Compensation <§==> 1820 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(S) Review by Board or Commission 
413kl820 Questions of Law or Fact and Findings. 
Although administrative law judge (ALJ) initially 
hears evidence, Industrial Commission is ultimate fact 
finder in workers' compensation proceeding. 
[2] Workers' Compensation <§=> 847 
413 — 
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability 
413IX(B)2 Total Incapacity 
413k847 Incapacity for Work or Employment 
Generally. 
Under "odd lot doctrine," Industrial Commission may 
find permanent total disability when relatively small 
percentage of impairment caused by industrial accident 
is combined with other factors to render workers' 
compensation claimant unable to obtain suitable 
employment. 
[3] Workers' Compensation <®=:=>847 
413 — 
4 BIX Amount and Period of Compensation 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 N< 
1 
.1996) Pagel 
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability 
413IX(B)2 Total Incapacity 
413k847 Incapacity for Work or Employment 
Generally. 
[See headnote text below] 
[3] Workers' Compensation <@^ 1375 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters 
413kl373 Amount and Period of Compensation 
413kl375 Extent and Duration of Injury or 
Disability. 
In workers' compensation proceeding, finding of 
permanent total disability under odd lot doctrine 
requires following: (1) employee must prove that he or 
she cannot perform duties required in his or her 
occupation, (2) after being referred to Division of 
Rehabilitation Services (DRS) by Industrial 
Commission, employee, with assistance of DRS, must 
prove that he or she cannot be rehabilitated, (3) if 
employee meets first two requirements, burden then 
shifts to employer to prove existence of regular, steady 
work employee can nonetheless perform, taking into 
account such factors as employee's age, mental 
capacity, and education. 
[4] Workers' Compensation <®^> 1639 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation 
413k 163 5 Compensation for Total Disability in 
General 
413kl639 Permanent Disability. 
In meeting its burden under odd lot doctrine, for 
purposes of avoiding finding of permanent total 
disability in workers' compensation proceeding, it is 
insufficient for employer to simply show that employee 
is generally capable of performing some type of work; 
rather, in order to prove existence of regular and steady 
work employee can perform, employer must prove that 
regular, dependable work is available to employee. 
[5] Workers' Compensation <©=> 1639 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation 
413kl635 Compensation for Total Disability in 
General 
413kl639 Permanent Disability. 
In order to prove existence of regular and steady 
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work employee can perform, for purposes of satisfying 
its burden under odd lot doctrine and thereby avoiding 
finding of permanent total disability in workers' 
compensation proceeding, employer must introduce 
evidence of actual job within reasonable distance from 
employee's home which he or she is able to perform or 
for which he or she can be trained, and employer must 
also show that employee has reasonable opportunity to 
be employed at that job. 
[6] Workers' Compensation <@=* 1385 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(M) Admissibility of Evidence 
413kl385 Hearsay. 
Hearsay evidence, even if objected to, is admissible 
in administrative hearing before Industrial 
Commission; however, Commission's findings of fact 
cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-88. 
[7] Workers' Compensation <®^ 1939.4(3) 
413 -— 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, 
Commission, Board, Officer, or 
Arbitrator 
413kl939.4 Sufficiency of Evidence in Support 
413kl939.4(3) Competent Evidence. 
To support Industrial Commission's findings in 
workers' compensation proceeding, under residuum 
rule, there must be residuum of evidence, legal and 
competent in court of law. 
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure <@=>462 
15A—-
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak458 Evidence 
15Ak462 Weight and Sufficiency. 
Residuum rule requires that each finding of fact made 
by administrative agency be supported by residuum of 
legally competent evidence. 
[9] Workers'Compensation <©=> 1385 
413 —-
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(M) Admissibility of Evidence 
413kl385 Hearsay. 
[See headnote text below] 
[9] Workers' Compensation © ^ 1639 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation 
413k 163 5 Compensation for Total Disability in 
General 
413kl639 Permanent Disability. 
Report prepared by private rehabilitation firm 
concerning whether workers' compensation claimant 
could be rehabilitated was hearsay evidence, and 
therefore, under residuum rule, could not form sole 
basis for Industrial Commission's factual finding 
regarding claimant's potential for rehabilitation, where 
author of report never testified at hearing before 
administrative law judge (ALJ) or Industrial 
Commission. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67 (Repealed); Rules 
ofEvid., Rule 801. 
[10] Workers' Compensation <®=>1639 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation 
413kl635 Compensation for Total Disability in 
General 
413k 163 9 Permanent Disability. 
Industrial Commission's finding, under odd lot 
doctrine, that workers' compensation claimant, a 
former city firefighter, could be rehabilitated was not 
supported by residuum of nonhearsay evidence, where 
only supporting nonhearsay evidence was that claimant 
had been able to work for few months during two 
summers as fire marshall in national park located 
hundreds of miles away from claimant's permanent 
residence. Industrial Commission. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-67 (Repealed). 
[ 11 ] Workers' Compensation <&* 1791 
413— -
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(Q) Award or Judgment 
413kl788 Conclusiveness and Effect 
413kl791 Matters Concluded. 
Under former workers' compensation statute 
governing award of permanent total disability benefits, 
once Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS) 
certified to Industrial Commission *150 in writing 
that claimant could not be rehabilitated, Commission 
was unable to revisit issue of rehabilitation or consider 
other evidence regarding claimant's rehabilitation. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67 (Repealed). 
[ 12] Workers' Compensation <©=> 1639 
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413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation 
413k 1635 Compensation for Total Disability in 
General 
413kl639 Permanent Disability. 
For purposes of determining whether workers' 
compensation claimant suffered permanent total 
disability, employer failed to meet its burden, under 
odd lot doctrine, of proving existence of regular, steady 
work that claimant could perform, though report 
prepared by private rehabilitation firm identified 
several job titles which existed in region of claimant's 
residence, as there was no evidence in report that such 
jobs were actually available to claimant or that 
claimant had reasonable opportunity to be employed in 
such jobs. 
i 
[13] Workers' Compensation <®=> 1639 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation 
413k 163 5 Compensation for Total Disability in 
General 
413kl639 Permanent Disability. 
In order to sustain its burden under odd lot doctrine, 
for purposes of avoiding finding of permanent total 
disability, employer must prove that actual job is 
regularly and continuously available to workers' 
compensation applicant, within reasonable proximity of 
his or her usual residence or residences, and that 
applicant has reasonable opportunity to be employed in 
particular job. 
*152 James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner. 
Alan L. Hennebold, Frank Nakamura, and Erie V. 
Boorman, Salt Lake City, for Respondents. 
Before ORME, DAVIS and BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Warren Hoskings seeks review of an 
Industrial Commission order that overturned an 
administrative law judge's decision granting him 
permanent total disability benefits. We reverse the 
Commission's order and remand with instructions to 
reinstate the administrative law judge's decision. 
FACTS 
[1] We recite the facts as found by the Commission. 
(FN1) In 1966, Hoskings began work as a fireman for 
Salt Lake City Corporation. He was promoted to 
lieutenant in 1974, and then to captain in the early 
1980's. 
In 1980, Hoskings injured Ms left ankle while 
fighting a fire. As a result of this injury, he underwent 
surgery but continued to experience pain. In April 
1986, Hoskings reinjured his left ankle in the course of 
his employment. The next day, he sought medical 
attention and was diagnosed with an acute left ankle 
sprain and calcaneous/cuboid joint problem. He was 
later diagnosed with the additional condition of 
traumatic osteoarthritis. 
Hoskings did not miss any time from work as a result 
of this injury. However, after the injury, he 
experienced chronic pain and difficulty in walking. 
Various physicians examined him and attempted to 
treat his injuries with conservative remedies. However, 
none of these treatments produced any significant 
improvement in Hoskings's left ankle. 
In 1988, Hoskings took early retirement from Salt 
Lake City Corporation, apparently to take advantage of 
an attractive early retirement package. At the time of 
his retirement, Hoskings did not inform Salt Lake City 
Corporation that his decision to retire was related in 
any manner to his left ankle injury. However, he 
testified before an administrative law judge in this 
proceeding that his injury did contribute to his decision 
to retire early. There is no evidence that his work 
performance was unsatisfactory prior to his retirement. 
During the summers of 1990 and 1991, after his 
retirement, Hoskings worked for Hamilton Stores as a 
fire marshall in Yellowstone National Park. A 
significant portion of his work day consisted of driving 
in a vehicle from one store to another, making 
inspections and teaching fire safety procedures. 
Hoskings reported no difficulties in performing the 
duties of this job. However, when the job was changed 
to a year-round position, he chose to resign because he 
believed the cold winter temperatures might aggravate 
his ankle pain. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS 
In 1990, Hoskings filed an Application for Hearing 
with the Industrial Commission. In his Application for 
Hearing, he claimed that Salt Lake City Corporation 
had refused to *153 pay him medical expenses, 
temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial 
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disability benefits, and permanent total disability 
benefits due him by reason of his ankle injury. An 
evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge 
was held on January 8, 1992. After the hearing, the 
ALJ referred the matter to a medical panel. The 
medical panel found that Hoskings's foremost 
orthopedic problem was the calcaneus/cuboid arthritis 
of his left ankle. The medical panel opined that the 
origin of this problem was definitely industrial and that 
it had worsened since the 1986 industrial accident. 
The ALJ then made a tentative finding of permanent 
total disability and, as required by statute, referred the 
case to the Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS) 
for an evaluation of Hoskings's susceptibility to 
rehabilitation. (FN2) According to the testimony of 
Frank Miera, the rehabilitation counselor assigned to 
evaluate Hoskings's case, DRS performed a one-week 
work evaluation during November 1992. Mr. Miera 
testified that Hoskings fully cooperated with the DRS 
during the evaluation and was very truthful and honest 
about his condition throughout the process. The 
evaluation was conducted by DRS rehabilitation 
counselors trained to administer such evaluations. Mr. 
Miera testified that in the regular course of his work as 
a DRS rehabilitation counselor, he refers applicants to 
trained DRS personnel and relies on their written 
reports in assessing an applicant's potential for 
rehabilitation. After the evaluation, Mr. Miera 
requested Hoskings to update him periodically on his 
condition. Mr. Miera testified that Hoskings did 
update him on his condition and reported that he was 
having the same problems with his left ankle. Mr. 
Miera concluded that it was not feasible for Hoskings 
to enter into a rehabilitation program. 
Salt Lake City Corporation then requested that 
Hoskings undergo a vocational evaluation to be 
performed by Intracorp, a private rehabilitation firm, 
which evaluation was completed during December 
1993. Salt Lake City Corporation submitted the 
Intracorp report to the ALJ. 
The Intracorp report concluded that Hoskings could 
be rehabilitated. The Intracorp evaluator, Jim Floyd, 
found that Hoskings demonstrated the capacity to learn 
and would be successful in formal training to prepare 
for more challenging and higher paying jobs. In his 
report, Mr. Floyd noted that Hoskings had improved 
physical stamina and that DRS's finding of poor 
physical stamina was no longer accurate. In addition, 
Mr. Floyd identified several jobs that Hoskings would 
qualify for given some limited training or schooling. 
Finally, the Intracorp report identified the regions of 
Utah that would provide the greatest opportunity for 
employment in the identified jobs. 
After receiving the DRS letter, Miera's testimony, and 
the Intracorp report, the ALJ entered her Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Applying the 
"odd lot" doctrine, the ALJ first found that Hoskings 
had met his burden of proving that the 1986 industrial 
accident caused his ankle injury and that he could not 
return to work as a fire fighter. Next, the ALJ found 
that Hoskings met his burden of proving he could not 
be rehabilitated. The ALJ then concluded that Salt 
Lake City Corporation had not met its burden to show 
that regular steady work was nonetheless available to 
Hoskings. Accordingly, the ALJ held that Hoskings 
was entitled to an award of permanent total disability 
benefits. 
Salt Lake City Corporation filed a Motion for Review 
with the Commission. The Commission *154 
reversed the ALJ's decision and held that Hoskings was 
not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. In 
reaching its decision, the Commission found that 
Hoskings could be rehabilitated and that regular, 
dependable employment was available to him in other 
branches of the labor market. 
On appeal, Hoskings argues that the Commission 
misinterpreted the "odd lot" doctrine by failing to 
apply the correct burdens of proof to the evidence 
introduced by the parties. In addition, he argues that 
the Commission's findings are not supported by 
competent legal evidence. Before turning to the 
specific claims, we review the legal principles 
applicable to this case, i.e., the "odd lot" doctrine and 
the residuum rule. 
"ODD LOT" DOCTRINE 
[2][3] Under the "odd lot" doctrine, (FN3) the 
Commission may find permanent total disability when 
a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by 
an industrial accident is combined with other factors to 
render the claimant unable to obtain suitable 
employment. See Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet 
Mgmt., 725 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986); Marshall v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1984). A 
finding of permanent total disability under the odd lot 
doctrine requires the following: (1) the employee must 
prove that he or she cannot perform the duties required 
in his or her occupation; (2) after being referred to the 
Division of Rehabilitation Services by the Industrial 
Commission, the employee, with the assistance of the 
DRS, must prove that he or she cannot be rehabilitated; 
(3) if the employee meets the first two requirements, 
the burden then shifts to the employer to prove the 
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existence of regular, steady work the employee can 
nonetheless perform, taking into account such factors 
as the employee's age, mental capacity, and education. 
Hardman, 725 P.2d at 1326-27. 
[4] [5] In meeting its burden, it is insufficient for the 
employer to simply show that the employee is generally 
capable of performing some type of work. Rather, in 
order to prove the existence of regular and steady work 
the employee can perform, the employer must prove 
that "regular, dependable work [is] available " to the 
employee. Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212 (emphasis 
added). This requires the employer to introduce 
evidence of "an actual job within a reasonable distance 
from [the employee's] home which he is able to 
perform or for which he can be trained." Lyons v. 
Industrial Special Indent. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 407, 
565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1977) (construing Idaho statute). 
See ARA Servs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 226 
Ill.App.3d 225, 168 Ill.Dec. 756, 761-62, 590 N.E.2d 
78, 83-84 (1992) (holding burden shifts to employer to 
show some kind of suitable work is available to 
claimant); Durbin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 558 
So.2d 1257, 1260 (La.App.1990) (requiring employer 
to prove some form of gainful occupation is regularly 
and continuously available to employee within 
reasonable proximity of his residence). Moreover, the 
employer must also show that the employee "has a 
reasonable opportunity to be employed at that job." 
Lyons, 565 P.2d at 1364. (FN4) 
*155 RESIDUUM RULE 
[6][7] Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1994) provides 
that "[n]either the Commission nor its hearing 
examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or 
statutory rules of evidence." Therefore, hearsay 
evidence, even if objected to, is admissible in an 
administrative hearing before the Commission. 
Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Comm'n, 
832 P.2d 477, 478 (Utah App.1992). However, the 
Commission's findings of fact "cannot be based 
exclusively on hearsay evidence." Yacht Club v. Utah 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 
1984) (emphasis in original). To support the 
Commission's findings, "there must be a residuum of 
evidence, legal and competent in a court of law." 
Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 315, 
358 P.2d 899, 901 (1961). 
[8] The residuum rule requires that each finding of 
fact made by an administrative agency be supported by 
a residuum of legally competent evidence. See Yacht 
Club, 681 P.2d at 1227; Industrial Power, 832 P.2d at 
479; Wagstaffv. Department of Employment Sec, 826 
P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah App.1992); Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32-33 (Utah 
App. 1991). For example, in Wagstaff, a former Air 
Force civilian employee, discharged for drug use, 
challenged a decision of the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission denying him unemployment 
compensation benefits. The employee claimed that 
since the Air Force disciplinary regulations in effect at 
the time of his drug use did not sanction discharge for 
first-time drug offenders, he was not terminated for just 
cause. 826 P.2d at 1070-71. 
In evaluating whether the employee was discharged 
for just cause, the Commission made a factual finding 
that he had used cocaine during Iris lunch break on one 
occasion. Id. at 1072. The Commission based its 
finding on an internal Air Force investigation report, as 
well as on the employee's own admission in testimony 
to the one-time drug use. Id. at 1071. The report 
contained the employee's admission to the one-time 
drug use, obtained in the course of investigation, as 
well as his coworkers' statements concerning the 
incident. Id. However, the report also contained 
statements from co-workers regarding the employee's 
drug use on other occasions. Id. In finding that the 
employee had engaged in drug use on one occasion, the 
Commission also made reference to the fact that the 
majority of the Board was not entirely persuaded that 
he had used drugs only on the one occasion. Id. at 
1072 n. 3. 
This court held that the Commission's finding of a 
single incident of drug use was supported by the 
employee's own admissions, and thus was supported by 
a residuum of competent, non-hearsay evidence. Id. at 
1072. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). However, 
although no actual finding of additional drug use was 
made by the Commission, this court was concerned that 
even the subtle reference to additional drug use 
contained in the Commission's written opinion, which 
could only be supported by the co-workers' hearsay 
statements not buttressed by a residuum of competent 
legal evidence, tainted its decision. Id. Therefore, in 
reviewing whether the employee's termination was for 
just cause, we evaluated the Board's decision solely 
with reference to the employee's single admitted 
instance of drug use. Id. 
Similarly, in this case, we must determine whether the 
Commission's findings of fact regarding rehabilitation 
and job availability are supported by a residuum of 
competent, nonhearsay evidence. If the Commission's 
findings of fact are not supported by a residuum of 
such evidence, Hoskings is entitled to appropriate 
relief. 
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ANALYSIS 
Under the odd lot doctrine, as explained above, the 
employee has the initial burden to prove he or she 
cannot perform the duties required in his or her 
occupation and that he or she cannot be rehabilitated. 
If the employee fails in meeting these burdens, the 
employer's burden to prove the existence of actual 
work the employee can perform is not *156 triggered 
and we need not evaluate whether that burden was 
actually met. 
In its order, the Commission reversed the ALJ's 
decision and found that Hoskings could be 
rehabilitated. Therefore, we first review the 
Commission's finding regarding Hoskings's potential 
for rehabilitation. (FN5) 
A. Rehabilitation 
[9] [10] In finding that Hoskings could be 
rehabilitated, the Commission relied on the conclusion 
to that effect in the Intracorp report. However, this 
report clearly meets the definition of hearsay under 
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. (FN6) The author 
of the report, Jim Floyd, never testified at a hearing 
before the ALJ or the Commission. Therefore, 
although the Intracorp report was admissible in the 
Commission's proceedings, it could not form the sole 
basis for the Commission's factual finding regarding 
Hoskings's potential for rehabilitation. Consequently, 
the Commission's factual finding that Hoskings could 
be rehabilitated cannot be sustained unless there is 
some other, non-hearsay evidence to support it. 
In its order, the Commission stated that "Inrracorp's 
conclusion [regarding rehabilitation] is corroborated by 
the fact that Hoskings found other work at Hamilton 
Stores and successfully performed his employment 
duties there." Salt Lake City Corporation argues that 
this fact supports the Commission's decision and 
provides the requisite residuum of competent legal 
evidence. However, this fact is essentially irrelevant to 
the issue of whether Hoskings could be rehabilitated 
into a well-known branch of the labor market. 
Hoskings testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
Hamilton Stores was seeking someone to work year 
round, including the winter months. Hoskings testified 
he was unable to work during the winter months 
because he could not stand the pain in his foot and 
ankle caused by the cold weather. Salt Lake City 
Corporation presented no contradicting evidence on 
this point. The mere fact that Hoskings was able to 
work for a few months during the summers of 1990 and 
1991 as a fire marshall in Yellowstone National Park, 
hundreds of miles from Salt Lake City and his 
permanent residences in Ivins and Vernal, Utah, does 
not support a finding that he can be successfully 
rehabilitated into any well-known branch of the labor 
market. (FN7) 
[11] Although we base our decision regarding 
rehabilitation on the residuum rule, which the parties 
have addressed in their briefs, there is an additional 
basis on which our decision could be premised. The 
applicable law regarding permanent total disability at 
the time of Hoskings's April 16, 1986, injury read, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
If the employee has tentatively been found to be 
permanently and totally disabled, it shall be 
mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah 
refer the employee to the [Division of Rehabilitation 
Services] for rehabilitation training.... If the division 
... certifies to the industrial commission of.Utah in 
writing that the employee has fully cooperated with 
the division ... in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in 
the opinion of the division the employee may not be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there be 
paid to the employee weekly benefits.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1974)(repealed 1988 
Utah Laws, ch.116, § 4) (emphasis added). *157 A 
plain reading of this statute suggests the determination 
of rehabilitation is vested in DRS, with no discretion 
left with the Commission to revisit the question and 
decide it anew. Therefore, it would appear that once 
DRS certified to the Commission in writing that 
Hoskings could not be rehabilitated, all inquiry into the 
issue of rehabilitation—a question delegated by the 
Legislature not to the Commission, but to DRS~should 
have ended. As we read the statute, the Commission 
was unable to revisit the issue of rehabilitation or to 
consider other evidence, such as the Intracorp report 
presented by Salt Lake City Corporation. (FN8) 
B. Job Availability 
Once it is determined that an employee cannot be 
rehabilitated-and such is the conclusion that must be 
drawn about Hoskings on the record before us~the 
burden then shifts to the employer to prove, 
notwithstanding the employee's general inability to be 
rehabilitated, the "existence of regular, steady work the 
employee can perform, taking into account such factors 
as the employee's age, mental capacity and education." 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet MgmL, 725 P.2d 
1323, 1326-27 (Utah 1986). However, as indicated 
above, the employer must introduce evidence of "an 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
918 P.2d 150, Hoskings v. Industrial Coirin of Utah, (Utah App. 1996) Page 7 
actual job within a reasonable distance from [the 
employee's] home which he is able to perform or for 
which he can be trained." Lyons v. Industrial Special 
Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 407, 565 P.2d 1360, 1364 
(1977). In addition, the employer must also show that 
the employee "has a reasonable opportunity to be 
employed at that job." Id. 
[12] In this case, the Commission relied exclusively 
on the Intracorp report to find that regular, dependable 
work was available to Hoskings. However, and totally 
aside from residuum rule concerns, a review of the 
substance of the Intracorp report reveals that it fails to 
prove that an actual job was available to Hoskings. 
Moreover, the Intracorp report fails to provide any 
analysis regarding whether or not Hoskings had a 
reasonable opportunity to be employed at any 
particular job, due regard being had for his age, mental 
capacity, and education. 
In assessing Hoskings's employability, Mr. Floyd, the 
author of the Intracorp report, ran three computer 
searches and two manual searches. In the first 
computer search, for occupations with skills that are 
directly transferrable from those of a firefighter, only 
one occupation emerged: surveillance-system monitor. 
The second computer search revealed three 
occupations that Hoskings could allegedly perform 
given some limited schooling or short term training. 
Finally, a third computer search was conducted which 
considered less closely related occupations using the 
same tools and machinery that Hoskings had used in 
his previous jobs. Two job titles emerged from this 
final computer search. 
After the computer searches were finished, the report 
indicates that two manual searches were conducted. 
The first search considered Hoskings's entire work 
history, including his military experience. In this 
search, three occupations emerged. Finally, using the 
Utah Department of Employment Security publication, 
"Occupations in Demand," for the period of January-
June, 1993, four job titles were identified. 
Although the searches contained in the report 
identified several job titles that existed *158. in the 
Wasatch Front region, no evidence shows that these 
jobs were actually available to Hoskings. First, 
nowhere in the report is there a meaningful discussion 
of the duties required in the occupations described. 
The report lacks any analysis of whether Hoskings 
could actually perform the duties required in these 
occupations given his disabilities. Furthermore, the 
report fails to show that these particular occupations 
are actually available, i.e., that the demand for such 
jobs has not been fully met by the workforce. 
Moreover, no evidence is contained in the report that 
would indicate Hoskings himself had a reasonable 
opportunity to be employed in these jobs, i.e., 
assuming some of these positions are available in 
general, what is the realistic prospect that an employer 
will choose a man in his mid-fifties with a bad ankle 
and other health problems to fill one of them? 
[13] Although the report claims to have considered 
"job availability" in the computer searches, no 
discussion as to what is meant by this term is contained 
in the report. In describing the second manual search, 
the report alleges that the four occupations found are 
"reasonably available in southwestern or northeastern 
regions of Utah." However, the report contains no 
evidence that these particular jobs are actually 
available to a person with the same disabilities as 
Hoskings. It is insufficient for Salt Lake City 
Corporation to allege that a particular occupation is 
generally available to the public at large, without 
providing further evidence that the particular 
occupation is actually available to Hoskings. In other 
words, in order to sustain its burden under the odd lot 
doctrine, an employer must prove that an actual job is 
regularly and continuously available to the applicant, 
within a reasonable proximity of his or her usual 
residence or residences, and that the applicant has a 
reasonable opportunity to be employed in the particular 
job. (FN9) 
Although we conclude that Salt Lake City 
Corporation failed in a more general way to meet its 
burden in this regard under the odd lot doctrine, we 
also conclude that the Commission's finding as to job 
availability was, at a more technical level, not based on 
a residuum of competent legal evidence. 
The Commission based its finding that other work 
was available to Hoskings exclusively on the Intracorp 
report. However, as we indicated above, the Intracorp 
report is hearsay. Thus, although this report was 
admissible during the administrative proceedings held 
before the Commission, it cannot be the sole basis for 
the Commission's finding. Rather, the Commission 
must base its findings on legally competent evidence~a 
finding cannot be based solely on hearsay. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the statute regarding permanent total 
disability in effect at the time of Hoskings's injury, it 
may have been improper for the Commission to 
consider the Intracorp report on the issue of 
rehabilitation. If not, the Commission nonetheless 
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erred, given the residuum rule, in finding that Hoskings 
could be rehabilitated. Further, Salt Lake City 
Corporation failed to sustain its burden under the odd 
lot doctrine to prove the existence of a regular, steady 
job that was actually available to Hoskings. 
Alternatively, in light of the residuum rule, the 
Commission erred in finding that Salt Lake City 
Corporation had met this burden. 
Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's order and 
remand with instructions to reinstate the administrative 
law judge's decision. 
DAVIS, Associate P.J., concurs. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs in result. 
(FN1.) Although an administrative law judge initially 
hears the evidence, the Commission is the ultimate 
fact finder. Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 
1284, 1287 (Utah App.1990). 
(FN2.) The applicable law regarding permanent total 
disability, in effect at the time of Hoskings's second 
injury, read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If the employee has tentatively been found to be 
permanently and totally disabled, it shall be 
mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah 
refer the employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation [since renamed the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services] under the state board of 
education for rehabilitation training.... If the division 
of vocational rehabilitation ... certifies to the 
industrial commission of Utah in writing that the 
employee has fully cooperated with the division of 
vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate 
him, and in the opinion of the division the employee 
may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order 
that there be paid to the employee weekly benefits.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1974)(repealed 1988 
Utah Laws, ch. 116, §4). 
(FN3.) The term "odd lot" was first used by Judge 
Moulton in the case of Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, 1 K.B. 
1009(1911): 
[T]here are cases in which the onus of sh[o]wing that 
suitable work can in fact be obtained does fall upon 
the employer who claims that the incapacity of the 
workman is only partial. If the accident has left the 
workman so injured that he is incapable of becoming 
an ordinary workman of average capacity in any well 
known branch of the labour market~if in other words 
the capacities for work left to him fit him only for 
special uses and do not, so to speak, make his powers 
of labour a merchantable article in some of the well 
known lines of the labour market, I think it is 
incumbent upon the employer to sh[o]w that such 
special employment can in fact be obtained by him. 
If I might be allowed to use such an undignified 
phrase, I should say that if the accident leaves the 
workman's labour in the position of an "odd lot" in 
the labour market, the employer must sh[o]w that a 
customer can be found who will take it. 
Id. at 1020-21 (quoted in 1C Arthur Larson & Lex K. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 
57.51(b), at 10-330 (1995)). 
*158_ (FN4.) After his retirement, Hoskings moved 
from Salt Lake City, Utah. He now has homes in 
Ivins and Vernal, Utah. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated, "[a] claimant should not be permitted to 
achieve permanent disability by changing his place of 
residence." Lyons, 565 P.2d at 1364 n. 3. Therefore, 
in this case, in considering whether Salt Lake City 
Corporation met its burden, evidence of job 
availability in Salt Lake City, Ivins, and Vernal, Utah, 
would all be germane. See id. 
(FN5.) The first prong of the odd lot doctrine, whether 
the employee can perform the duties required in his 
or her occupation, is not at issue in this appeal. 
(FN6.) Utah R. Evid. 801 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended by the person as an assertion. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
(FN7.) One of the motives behind the "odd lot" 
doctrine is a desire to encourage efforts by a claimant 
to rehabilitate himself. See 1C Arthur Larson & Lex 
K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 
57.51(f), at 10-357 to -359 (1995). Therefore, courts 
are careful to avoid penalizing or discouraging a 
claimant from attempting to rehabilitate himself in 
some type of special work setting. Id. See also note 
4. 
(FN8.) To the extent this interpretation raises a 
possible due process concern, as suggested by Salt 
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Lake City Corporation at oral argument, we note that a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider 
the Legislature has amended this statute to allow for a evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any 
mandatory hearing regarding the issue of reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its 
rehabilitation. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994) insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).... 
currently reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(6)(a) A finding by the commission of permanent 
total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to 
by the parties, until: 
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds 
(FN9.) Of course, the employer does not become an 
employment agency for the applicant. The employer 
is not required to find a particular position for an 
applicant, much less arrange for an interview. 
Rather, the employer must only prove that an actual 
job does exist in the usual residence or residences of 
the applicant and that he or she has a reasonable 
opportunity to be employed in that job. 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
RE: Utah Disaster Kleenup and Workers Compensation Fund v. Lori McCoy and The 
Labor Commission of Utah 
Labor Commission Case No. 00-0511 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20020234-CA 
Clerk of the Court: 
We are transmitting to you the index of the complete file in the above entitled claim now 
pending on Petition For Review before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The Utah Labor Commission 
y'll^A </ <U (• ' ^ i 
Sara Danielson 
The Utah Labor Commission 
Legal Support Specialist 
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CERTIFICATE OF RECORD 
Re: Utah Disaster Kleenup and Workers Compensation Fund v. Lori McCoy and The Labor 
Commission of Utah 
Labor Commission Case No. 00-0511 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20020234-CA 
I, Sara Danielson, Legal Support Specialist for the Utah Labor Commission, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing instruments numbered 00001 through 00263 inclusive, contain the 
original documents in the above-entitled cause, including true and correct copies of the original 
Orders made in the proceedings at the Labor Commission. These documents constitute the 
whole record of the proceedings as the same appear of record in my office. 
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Labor 
Commission this 11th day of April, 2002. 
Sara Danielson 
The Utah Labor Commission 
Legal Support Specialist 
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